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WOMEN CHOOSING DIVERSE WORKPLACES:
A RATIONAL PREFERENCE WITH DISTURBING
IMPLICATIONS FOR BOTH OCCUPATIONAL
SEGREGATION AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
SCOTT A. Moss*
OVERVIEW
Despite women's dramatic labor market gains, there remains a striking
degree of occupational segregation by gender. Analysts typically blame
discrimination or women's work/family priorities. This Article offers a
different explanation.
It is hard for women choosing jobs or occupations to know where they
will face discrimination, particularly since recent judicial decisions elimi-
nated certain employer signals that once differentiated fair and discrimi-
natory firms. One way women can effectuate a preference for nondis-
criminatory workplaces is by choosing gender-diverse workplaces. Non-
diverse workplaces often are not female-friendly, and discrimination may
be the reason they are nondiverse. In economic terms, women rationally
use level of diversity as a proxy for discrimination, since the latter is
harder to observe.
When a preference for diversity is incorporated into standard labor-
economic analyses, it generates a bleak prediction: women's preferences
for diversity can yield enduring segregation, even in nondiscriminatory
workplaces, and even as more women enter the labor force. Title VII has
reduced discrimination and raised female labor force participation, but
neither of these successes may reduce segregation.
Normatively, although this Article could be interpreted to support a
"conservative" argument to narrow Title VII liability (because a work-
place underrepresentation of women may reflect women's own choices
rather than discrimination), it more forcefully supports a contrary "lib-
eral" argument: to redress segregation, we must go beyond just fighting
actual discrimination. Advisable measures include changes to the focus
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and burdens of proof in Title VII cases, affirmative action, and education
reform.
More theoretically, certain standard economic tenets, such as fixed
exogenous preferences and the Coase Theorem, are undercut by key fea-
tures of these models (e.g., endogenous labor supply preferences, path-
dependent market evolution, and multiple equilibria). We cannot assume
that such markets, left unregulated, are efficient, so the case for labor market
intervention is much stronger than economics typically recognizes.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the more enduring riddles of the American labor market is
that even as women have made dramatic labor market gains, there re-
mains a striking degree of occupational segregation by gender. Women's
progress in the labor market has been significant: their labor force par-
ticipation rates have increased sharply' to within almost fifteen percent of
men's.2 Nearly half the workforce (forty-six percent) is now female,3 and
the male-female wage gap, although still significant, has decreased.'
Yet occupational segregation by gender has persisted, to the great
detriment of women. Women remain overrepresented in low-paying and
underrepresented in high-paying occupations.' "Even within narrowly
defined occupations, men and women are often segregated across em-
ployers,"6 with some firms including women and others remaining male-
dominated, in fields as wide-ranging as restaurants 7 and major law firms.'
I RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY, at inside back cover tbl. 6.1 (8th ed. 2003) (women's labor force
participation rates, as a percentage of all women, hovered between 20.0% and 30.0% from
1900 through 1950, but rose to 37.7% in 1960, 43.3% in 1970, 51.5% in 1980, 57.5% in
1990, and 60.0% in 1999).
2 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SUR-
VEY, http://www.bls.gov/cps/home.htm (Jan. 2004) (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
3JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 67 (2000) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER].
4 EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 379 (noting that women's earnings as com-
pared to men's have increased from 50% in 1970. to 59% in 1980, to 65% in 1999, though
the male-female wage gap has remained fairly stable since 1990).
I d. at 379-80.
6 Id. at 384.
I d. at 384 (noting that "it is common for restaurants to employ only waiters or only
waitresses, but not both").
I Even among law firms of similar prominence and type, the representation of women
varies widely. For example, there are only twelve law firms in New York City with more
than 300 associates. (I examine associates rather than partners because the gender gap in
partners partly stems from hiring practices decades ago, whereas associate hiring reflects
only recent hiring.) These are very similar firms: all recruit from the same law schools,
serve major corporations as clients, and feature a wide range of practice areas. Yet despite
having so much in common, they vary quite substantially in their inclusion of women as
associates. At the top third in representation of women, about half (47-51%) of the associ-
ates are female: Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP (51%), Debevoise & Plimpton LLP
(49%), Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton (47%), and Coudert Brothers LLP (47%). At
[Vol. 27
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Historically, discrimination and harassment served to maintain tra-
ditional "patterns of sex segregation in employment that consigned
women to lower-status, lower-paying, female-dominated jobs."9 Segrega-
tion declined when women first entered the labor force in larger numbers,
but "the pace slowed" and in the 1990s "fell by only a percentage point
or two."' 0 Surprisingly, although the black-white wage gap is wider than
the male-female wage gap, "[o]ccupational segregation appears to be less
prevalent by race than by gender .... [R]acial occupational dissimilari-
ties are smaller and have fallen faster over time than gender-related
ones."i
Perhaps worst of all, there has been virtually no decrease in the gen-
der segregation of particular occupations and jobs. Many occupations are
less than five percent or more than ninety-five percent female-mainly
blue-collar, mechanical, and other stereotypically "male" work and office
assistance or caregiving "female" work, respectively. 2 Segregation is
present not only among fields, but also at the micro-level; even within the
same workplace, women often are clustered into "pink-collar ghettos" of
lower-status departments. 3 In white-collar jobs, the "glass ceiling" remains;
women are only a small fraction of law firm partners, executives at pub-
licly traded companies, and tenured professors. 4
Labor economists and legal analysts alike offer dual explanations for
the riddle of continued segregation. First, women may be excluded from
the middle third, 42-43% of the associates are female: LeBoeuf, Lamb. Greene & MacRae
LLP (43%), Shearman & Sterling LLP (43%), Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP (43%), and
Davis Polk & Wardwell (42%). At the bottom third, only 37-39% of associates are female.
At the bottom, predictably. is Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates
(37%-a figure that has remained unchanged for the past three years), followed closely by
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (38%), Sullivan & Cromwell LLP (38%), and
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP (39%). NAT'L ASS'N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, NALP DIREC-
TORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS 1288, 1291, 1293. 1295, 1297, 1340, 1348, 1375, 1377, 1379,
1383, 1392 (2003) [hereinafter NALP DIRECTORY].
9 Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2075 (2003).
10 EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 384. The "index of dissimilarity"-a measure
of "the percentage of the other gender that would have to change occupations for the two
genders to have equal occupational distributions"-was 68 in 1970, 59 in 1980, and 53 in
1990, with only a one to two percent decrease in the 1990s. Id. at 383-84.
' Id. at 391 (noting further that "indices comparing black and white occupational dis-
tributions had values roughly half the size of indices comparing male/female occupational
distributions").
12 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 292 tbl.3 (2000)
[hereinafter Jolls, Mandates]. Jolls's research includes sixty-nine occupations that were
more than 95% male, most notably a wide range of blue-collar/mechanical jobs, including
supervisory positions, numerous transportation jobs (such as airplane pilots and ship cap-
tains), and firefighting. Seven fields were more than 95% female: secretaries (98.7%),
dental hygienists (98.4%), prekindergarten and kindergarten teachers (97.8%), childcare
workers in private households (97.3%), dental assistants (97.1%), receptionists (95.7%),
and childcare workers other than private households (95.6%). Jolls adds that "[mlany more
occupations were between ninety and ninety-five percent female or male ..... Id. at 292.
13 See infra note 217 (citing evidence and examples of segregation within firms and
subfields of occupations).
14 WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER. supra note 3, at 67.
2004]
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certain occupations' 5 by discriminatory employers and by the resulting
disincentive for discriminated-against workers to accumulate education
and training. Second, women may have "different preferences ... or dif-
ferent household responsibilities (particularly related to child care)."' 6
The latter explanation may reflect either innate gender differences or
"premarket discrimination-differential treatment by parents, schools,
and society at large that points girls toward lower-paying (including
household) pursuits."'7 The above explanations demonstrate the central
debate: whether segregation is due to discrimination (in employment or
childhood) or women's inherent preferences.
Discrimination and work-family conflict certainly play a role,'8 as
does early socialization, though not to as large an extent as is commonly
assumed, given the evidence that women's preferences for different types
of work change substantially throughout their careers. 9 However, this
Article suggests an important additional reason for the labor market's
halting progress toward equality and the surprising degree of segregation
that remains.
It is well-established that women prefer nondiscriminatory workplaces.
But for a woman facing a real-world choice among jobs or occupations,
it is hard to tell which employers discriminate, especially since recent
developments in employment discrimination have mandated many of the
employment policies, such as family/parental leave and workplace promises
of nondiscrimination, that employers once used to "signal" gender inclu-
siveness.
One way women can effectuate their preference for nondiscrimina-
tory workplaces is by choosing gender-diverse workplaces-workplaces
that feature a mix of men and women."0 This result may sound obvious,
but these criteria (nondiscrimination and gender diversity) are not per-
fectly overlapping: gender-diverse workplaces may still be affected by
gender discrimination, and nondiverse workplaces may not be. Never-
theless, the level of diversity does convey useful information about dis-
crimination. A nondiverse workplace might have developed as a result of
gender discrimination, and nondiverse workplaces have certain charac-
teristics inherently disadvantageous to women. Given the history of dis-
crimination and exclusion, the assumption of a connection between gen-
der diversity and better treatment of women is entirely reasonable. In
15 Women may also be preferred for certain occupations, such as the various office as-
sistance or caregiving "female" jobs that are more than ninety-five percent female. See
Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12.
16 EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 383.
17Id.
18 See generally WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3 (arguing that work-
family conflict is at the heart of much of today's workplace inequality by gender).
'9 See infra text accompanying notes 236-247.
2 See infra note 197 for a more detailed definition of gender diversity as the term is
used in this Article.
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economic terms, women rationally use the level of diversity as a proxy
for discrimination, which is more difficult to observe. In this light,
women's preference for diversity is "rational discrimination" by employ-
ees against employers-a generalization that, though imperfect, is logical
given employees' imperfect information about which employers dis-
criminate.
Worker decisionmaking under conditions of imperfect information is
a subject ripe for economic analysis. Yet a preference for diverse work-
places is not incorporated into standard economic analyses of workplace
gender disparities. When taken into account, this preference dramatically
changes the predictions about the durability of gender disparities. To the
extent that women disproportionately choose workplaces already em-
ploying a significant number of women, those workplaces become even
more inclusive of women. Those without many women will find them-
selves, over time, lacking female applicants and lagging even further in
diversification.
This Article uses several economic models-some quantitative, oth-
ers qualitative but based on economic theory-that predict that even as
more women enter the labor force, the gender gap between diverse and
nondiverse occupations (or individual firms) will grow. Just as disturb-
ingly, several models predict that women's preferences for diversity can
lead to enduring segregation even in industries (or individual firms) that
do not discriminate. The Title VII era has reduced discrimination and
increased female labor force participation-two successes that have been
widely viewed as the two-part cure for occupational segregation. This
Article sounds a note of pessimism in predicting that neither of these two
advances may be sufficient to reduce gender segregation in the labor
market. Discrimination does, however, exacerbate the degree and dura-
bility of occupational segregation, as this Article's models illustrate.
The Article then turns to the normative implications of the economic
models presented. These models could be interpreted to support a "con-
servative" argument that a predominantly male workplace might lack
women even though it has not discriminated against women and, there-
fore, that a statistical gender disparity does not necessarily prove dis-
crimination. Further, the ideas presented here could be used to support
the argument that it is women's fault that labor markets remain segre-
gated-a variant of the "lack of interest" argument used by some em-
ployers with egregious gender segregation. However, this is a flawed in-
terpretation that ignores the constraints on women's work choices.
This Article's observations more forcefully support an entirely con-
trary, more "liberal" argument: to redress occupational segregation, soci-
ety must go beyond fighting just what currently constitutes legally ac-
tionable discrimination. Since current antidiscrimination laws alone will
not abolish segregation given women's preference for diverse workplaces,
further measures to reduce segregation should be taken, including changes
2004]
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in the focus and burdens of proof in Title VII cases, affirmative action,
and educational reform.
Finally, this Article discusses the theoretical implications of its models
for economic analysis of law. Several standard economic assumptions, such
as fixed preferences and the efficiency of free market transactions (the
Coase Theorem), are undercut by key features of these models. Women's
labor supply preferences are endogenous in that they depend on the level
of female labor already being supplied. Labor market evolution thus is
path-dependent, hinging on earlier market phenomena. Depending on its
history, the labor market can reach multiple equilibrium outcomes, some
far more efficient than others. In such situations, there is little basis for
assuming that unregulated markets will reach efficient outcomes. The
case for a laissez-faire policy of nonintervention in labor markets is
therefore weaker, and the case for legal or regulatory intervention
stronger, than economic analyses typically recognize.
II. DISCRIMINATION AS A DETERRENT TO WORKFORCE ENTRY
A. The Ability (and Failure) of Most Economic Models To Incorporate
Women's Nonmonetary Preferences
Traditional economics assumes that money drives people to buy or
sell goods or services. The basic labor supply graphic model reflects this,
showing the direct relationship between wages and workers' willingness
to accept jobs or additional hours.2' Higher wages certainly are a primary
motivation for workers; even people with other job goals will, all else
being equal, take the higher-paying job.22 Wages are not the whole story,
of course, and labor economists do not pretend they are: "nonpecuniary
factors-such as work environment, risk of injury, personalities of man-
agers, perceptions of fair treatment, and flexibility of work hours-loom
larger in employment transactions than they do in markets for commodi-
ties. '23 Indeed, it is a "common misconception[ ] about economics ...
that it slights non-quantifiable costs and benefits. ' 24 For example, even
bigotry is a nonmonetary preference that economic analyses can consider
21 See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note I, at 40 fig. 2.9.
22 Id. at 40-4 1.
23 Id. at 2.
24 RICHARD POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1. I, at 7 n.8 (5th ed. 1998)
[hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS]; see also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Rationality in
Law and Economics Scholarship, 79 OR. L. REV. 147, 169 (2000) (noting, in a generally
critical discussion of contemporary economic analysis of law, that Posnerian economic
analysis allows for people to "have bizarre tastes and pursue 'crazy' goals so long as [they]
... consistently pursue those goals"). But see Richard Epstein, Standing Firm, On Forbid-
den Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1994) (arguing against legal redress for
psychological harm to victims of discrimination and asserting that such persons should
"learn to deal with offensive and rude statements without recourse to law").
[Vol. 27
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in analyzing labor market decisions; Richard Posner has written that
"contact between members of the two races . . . imposes nonpecuniary,
but real, costs on those ... who dislike association with members of the
other race."25 If economics can incorporate nonmonetary preferences such
as distaste for diversity, then it can certainly incorporate preference for
diversity.
B. Women's Preference for Nondiscriminatory Workplaces
1. Women's Preference for Fair Workplace Treatment:
The Basic Economics
Viewed in the broadest sense, men and women have the same work-
place preferences-tangible items such as compensation and promotion,
as well as intangibles such as fair treatment.2 6 This does not mean every-
one seeks the same specific ends. Gary Becker has noted that even if
people pursue "general ends that remain constant," they pursue more
specific goals "as means [to those] more general ends. '27 Furthermore,
even as people pursue the same universal goals, their specific preferences
change based on social circumstances.
28
Given the deep-rooted gender problems of the modern workforce,
including discrimination and harassment, it is entirely rational for female
job seekers to consider how various workplaces treat women. That specific
preference is a means to the more general, universal preference of fair
workplace treatment. Basic economic logic supports such a strategy for
female workers: discrimination lowers the expected payoff (monetary or
otherwise) of employment, so with less discrimination, women "are
likely to be more willing to supply labor at any given wage. 29
25 POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 26.4, at 715; see also Scott A. Moss
& Daniel A. Malin, Public Funding for Disability Accommodations: A Rational Solution to
Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197,
204-05 (1998) (citing Epstein, supra note 24, at 42, 75). In analyzing what motivates em-
ployment decisions, economic theory does not approve of such preferences; rather, it sim-
ply recognizes that some people act not just upon their monetary interests but also upon
their personal biases.26 See generally EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 231-33. "The assumption that
workers are attempting to maximize their utility implies that they are interested in both the
pecuniary and the nonpecuniary aspects of their jobs," including "the work environment,
the risk of injury," "discretion over the hours or the pace of work," "commuting distances
and neighborhood characteristics." Id. at 231-32.
21 Schroeder, supra note 24, at 212 (quoting GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR
TASTES 87 (1996)).
28 See id.
29 Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,
691 & n.222 (2001) [hereinafter Jolls, Antidiscrimination] (citing John J. Donohue III,
Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1337, 1349 (1989)); see also Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work:
Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815-39 (1990) [hereinafter Schultz,
2004]
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2. Effects of Discrimination on Women's Choices To Enter or
Remain in the Workforce
As Vicki Schultz has discussed, women often face what could be
called the direct effects of discrimination in traditionally male fields: men
stereotype women and try to exclude them from the workplace, and fe-
male workers, less likely to be treated well, are more likely to quit.30 She
argues that to the extent that women prioritize family or leisure over
work, they do so because they perceive little opportunity for career ad-
vancement.3 In traditionally male fields, male hostility (e.g., harassment,
sabotage, denial of training) makes women less likely to succeed.32 Re-
gardless of differing views as to why discrimination occurs, there re-
mains a "broad range of empirical evidence"-studies of the gender wage
gap, testing of employer treatment of identical male and female appli-
cants, and widespread cases of discrimination-"that an important part of
the explanation for women's present labor market position is the contin-
ued existence of. . . discrimination against women."33
The problem, however, is not limited to women who directly face
discrimination; it also includes the indirect effects of discrimination,
which heavily influence female labor force participation. In several ways,
discrimination discourages women from entering (or remaining in) the
workforce, and particularly from seeking traditionally male jobs.
Telling Stories].
30Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1834 ("Harassment is ... driving the
small number of women in nontraditional jobs away. Blue-collar tradeswomen report that
women are leaving the trades because they cannot tolerate the hostile work cultures, and
there are signs that this is occurring in male-dominated professions as well."). In Vermett v.
Hough, 627 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Mich. 1986), for example, the court made several telling
findings of fact in a case involving a female state trooper's claims of gender discrimination
and harassment by the Michigan Department of State Police: "Out of 75 male[s] and 22
females admitted to the school, 53 males and 10 females graduated"; "Vermett was the first
female trooper ever assigned to [her location] .... [At her next location,] she was one of
over 80 troopers. She was the fifth female"; "[iut is evident that the Department had serious
problems associated with the entry of females and other minorities as troopers," including
a high attrition rate. Id. at 590, 591-92, 602. Nevertheless, the court rejected Vermett's
claim, relying on the Department's affirmative action efforts and finding the plaintiff to be
an insecure and very angry woman; insecure in her abilities, angry at men in gen-
eral and her male co-workers and superiors in particular. Vermett's words demon-
strate an individual highly suspicious of each male act or failure to act, word or
silence, and her imagined motives behind each .... In sum, the attitude displayed
is of a deeply troubled woman pre-disposed to interpret her experiences at the
State Police as sex discrimination or sexual harassment and thereby, tragically,
destined to fail.
Id. at 600.
31 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1827-31 (noting that the same is true of
men in dead-end jobs).
32 Id. at 1832-39.
3 3 Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2, 5-7, 9-15
(2002) [hereinafter Jolls, Glass Ceiling].
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a. The Human Capital Problem: Expectation of Discrimination as a
Disincentive to Women's Workforce Participation
Expectation of discrimination is a disincentive to obtaining education
or training, or otherwise expending time and money, preparing for a ca-
reer. This is the cycle of diminished human capital that discrimination
causes: "[W]hen discrimination lowers a rational actor's reasonable ca-
reer expectations, he or she spends less time, effort, and money amassing
human capital, as discrimination lowers the rate of return on that capi-
tal."34 One cause of discrimination is animus-based bias (e.g., misogynist
refusals to hire women). Another is stereotypical employer judgments
based on group status (e.g., assuming a certain level of competence for
all women in certain positions or assuming that all women will become
pregnant at some point and leave their jobs). As Robert Cooter has ex-
plained, "[i]f employers attribute to each individual the average produc-
tivity of members of the group . . . , each individual will have a tendency
to under-invest in acquiring productivity -increasing skills."35
Not only does discrimination lower human capital, it also negatively
influences the strategic choices of discriminated-against groups. David
Charny and G. Mitu Gulati note that such workers have an increased in-
centive to engage in various otherwise ill-advised workplace strategies:
"high-risk" strategies (e.g., taking on a longshot project) to break out of a
stereotype and signal "superstar" status, or "low-effort" strategies (e.g.,
working fewer hours) because the prospect of being judged by a stereo-
type rather than by performance makes it less worthwhile to work hard.
3 6
Though perhaps a rational response to discrimination, these strategies can be
self-defeating. Even talented workers may fail at high-risk endeavors,
and many talented (or at least competent) workers' careers will stall due
to low-effort strategies.37 As a result, discriminated-against groups will
have fewer successful workers, and "[t]he perception of discrimination
on the part of the minority workers becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy."38
Women's lower levels of workforce participation may also be a ra-
tional response to discrimination. As Christine Jolls has noted, when a
34 Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 205 (citing R. Bales, Libertarianism, Environmen-
talism, and Utilitarianism: An Examination of Theoretical Frameworks for Enforcing Title
I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1993 DET. C.L. REV. 1163, 1209 (1993) (dis-
cussing the problem in the context of disability discrimination)); see also David Charny &
G. Mitu Gulati, Efficiency-Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employ-
ment Discrimination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57, 65 (1998);
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 388 (noting that the current wage gap "could dis-
courage women from making certain human capital investments," though it is unclear how
much of the gap results from discrimination).
35 Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 133, 158 (1994);
see also Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 65.36 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 84-85, 91.
371 d. at 91.
38 Id.
20041
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married couple feels the need for one person to suspend or limit workforce
participation because of family needs such as childcare, and if "because of
sex discrimination ... [women] will have fewer opportunities and earn
less than their male counterparts, then it makes perfect financial sense for
the female rather than the male ... to take the leave or depart from her
current employer to provide her better-suited partner with greater career
opportunities."39 Even absent a higher-earning husband, 40 this effect on
women remains because the backdrop of discrimination makes it "natural
for aspirations and values to develop such that male employees, more so
than female employees, view career advancement as central to their
identities and life goals."
4 1
b. Expectation of Discrimination in Particular Fields: Disincentive
to Women's Participation in Traditionally Male Jobs
Expectation of discrimination functions as a disincentive not only to
workforce participation generally but also to participation in the particular
fields with the most discrimination. The problems in such fields include
overt discrimination that seeks to exclude women, harmful psychological
effects of stereotyping, and human capital disincentives based on this
discrimination and stereotyping.
i. Gender Discrimination in Traditionally Male Jobs
Schultz has noted that "[w]omen in female jobs understand that they
will be likely to experience harassment if they attempt to cross the gen-
der divide. '4 2 She has written at length about the "proven link between
hostile work environment harassment and job segregation. '43 Specifically,
there is a "classic pattern of harassment often directed at women who try
to claim male-dominated work as their own" by trying to enter tradition-
ally male fields. 4 Such harassment is aimed at "driving women out of
39Jolls. Glass Ceiling, supra note 33, at 16: see also POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS.
supra note 24. § 5.1. at 157 (asserting that "to the extent that sex discrimination in the
labor market depresses women's market earnings relative to men's, it makes household
work relatively more attractive to the wife than to the husband").
40 For example, families with single parents, lesbian couples, or lower-earning hus-
bands.
41 Jolls, Glass Ceiling, supra note 33, at 16; see also Schultz, Telling Stories, supra
note 29, at 1827 (discussing how members of either sex, but more often females, who face
"little opportunity for growth or upward mobility," will "turn[ ] their energies elsewhere,"
"not define work as a central life interest,- "dream of escape from their jobs and often
interrupt their careers").
12 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1834.
11 Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1801
(1998) [hereinafter Schultz, Harassment].
4Id. at 1712. Schultz points to Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., a landmark case of
blue-collar workplace gender discrimination in which a male employee's conduct-
[Vol. 27
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nontraditional jobs."45 In arguing that the focus of antiharassment law
should be the negative effects of harassment on women's workplace equal-
ity, not workplace sexuality, Schultz contends that "[w]here sexual mis-
conduct occurs, it is typically part of a broader pattern of harassment de-
signed to reinforce gender difference and to claim work competence and
authority as masculine preserves."46 In this light, harassment is "both a
cause and consequence of larger forms of gender-based stratification of
work, such as job segregation by sex and the accompanying wage and status
inequalities.
'47
Women develop negative expectations about specific fields not only
from their own experiences but also from the experiences of others. Shawn
Pompian has noted that "there is a persuasive argument that members of
minority groups ... share the unifying feature of a similar experience as
the targets of discrimination and oppression. '48 As a result, "members of
excluded minority groups ... may have heard anecdotal evidence of dis-
crimination from friends and acquaintances within their community" be-
cause of the "likelihood that communities develop an awareness of which
sorts of opportunities are open to them and which are foreclosed because
of discrimination. 49
Historical perspective also helps to indicate which employment op-
portunities are available to women. Because "employers have historically
relegated women to low-paid, traditionally female jobs," women may not
aspire to traditionally male jobs; "[m]ost people do not aspire to some-
thing they have never been permitted to do."50 This history of negative
treatment depresses women's expectations of success; consequently, women
may "lower[ ] their work aspirations and turn[] their energies else-
where,'" to fields traditionally more welcoming to women or nonwork
pursuits.
from the "sexual" conduct that reduced Harris to a sexual object as she struggled
to fulfill her work role, to the nonsexual but gender-biased conduct that deni-
grated her capacity to serve as a manager, to the facially gender-neutral conduct
that denied her the perks, privileges, and respect she needed to do her job well-
had the purpose and effect of undermining Harris's status and authority as a man-
ager on the basis of her sex.
Id. (discussing Harris, 60 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P 42,070, at 74,247 (M.D. Tenn. 1990),
aff'd, 976 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1992) (per curiam), rev'd, 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
4
5 Id. at 1760.
46 Id. at 1759.
471 d. at 1797.
48 Shawn Pompian, Expectations of Discrimination as a Justification for Affirmative
Action, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 517, 532 (2001).
49 Id. at 546-47.
50 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1793.
51 Id. at 1827.
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ii. Stereotype Threat
When women work in fields that are stereotyped as male, the back-
drop of discrimination can interfere with women's performance as well
as their inclination to remain in such jobs. One example of this harm is
"stereotype threat":
[W]hen certain groups of individuals realize that a negative
stereotype exists about their group in a given context (e.g.,
Blacks in academics, females in mathematics), this mere recog-
nition can significantly hinder their performance in that domain.
Although the individual does not have to believe the stereotype,
he or she will still feel the threat of being evaluated in terms of
the stereotype, . . . [a] threat engendered by the fear of
confirming the stereotype however false it may be.52
Stereotype threat has been shown to affect women in math53 and "can
affect the members of any group about whom a negative stereotype ex-
ists."54 The first women entering traditionally male fields risk being
viewed as "token" females less competent for the job. This tokenism
"will increase stress" due to the prospect of "greater scrutiny,"55 which is
why "groups constantly fac[ing] stereotype threat ... will seek to protect
themselves by withdrawing from or 'disidentifying' with the affected ar-
eas of activity. '5 6 The ultimate result is that stereotyping not only can
cause group members to underperform but also "can, over the long term,
cause ... reduce[d] participation in activities to which a negative stereo-
type applies.""
iii. The Human Capital Problem in Particular Fields: General and
Specific Human Capital
The "perception of employment discrimination[ ] may act as a bar-
rier to entry," inhibiting workers from entering those fields in which dis-
52 Jessi L. Smith & Paul H. White, Development of the Domain Identification Measure:
A Tool for Investigating Stereotype Threat Effects, 61 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT
1040, 1041, 1053 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Pompian, supra note 48, at 540-43
(discussing stereotype threat, mainly as applied to African Americans).
53 Smith & White, supra note 52, at 1040-42.
54 Pompian, supra note 48, at 542 n.83 (quoting Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air:
How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, in CONFRONTING RACISM:
THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 203-04 (Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds.,
1998)).
51 Id. at 540 n.74 (quoting Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and Its Discontents: The End of
Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2241, 2258-59 n.79 (2001)).
56 Id. at 541 (citing Steele, supra note 54, at 204-05).
17 Id. at 542.
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crimination is rampant. 8 This is the human capital problem again, but in
a more concentrated form-a disincentive to gaining human capital asso-
ciated with traditionally male fields. A discriminated-against group will
avoid not only specific tests or applications in, but also the educational
investments required to enter, fields beset with negative stereotypes of the
group.59 Posner has noted the importance of distinguishing two types of
human capital: "general human capital" and "firm-specific human capi-
tal."' However, the relative generality or specificity of human capital exists
along a spectrum. Certain learning may be applicable to a broad range of
jobs (e.g., high school education), only to certain fields (e.g., legal train-
ing), or only to a specific job (e.g., experience with a company's pro-
prietary technology).
The more discrimination there is in a particular field or firm, the less
incentive women will have to obtain field-specific or firm-specific human
capital, as women will "naturally choose not to invest in education and
training that would serve only to prepare them for employment in ... fore-
closed fields."'" This is especially true for expensive specific human
capital, such as graduate degrees, which are costly and require years of
little or no income.
62
iv. Women Exiting Workplaces That Discriminate
Women are disproportionately likely to exit male-dominated work-
places. Many anecdotal examples exist of women becoming discouraged
and leaving traditionally male work.63 Schultz has gathered considerable
58 Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Ac-
tion, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1118 (2001).
19 Pompian, supra note 48, at 542-51.
6" POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 11.4, at 358.
61 Pompian, supra note 48, at 543.
62 See Adams, supra note 58, at 1118.
63 See, e.g., supra note 30 (discussing gender segregation and female attrition in police
departments and among blue-collar tradeswomen). There are also numerous examples from
the legal profession. See, e.g., Maryann Jones, And Miles To Go Before I Sleep: The Road
to Gender Equity in the California Legal Profession, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 39 n.317 (1999)
(recounting that "women broke into many traditionally male jobs in the 1970's, but are no
longer there .... Title VII allowed women to get hired, but pervasive sexual harassment
resulted in many women quitting" (citing Mary C. Dunlap, Are We Integrated Yet? Pursu-
ing the Complex Question of Values, Demographics and Personalities, 29 U.S.F. L. REV.
693, 703 (1995))); id. at 44 n.344 (noting that "women are twice as likely as men to think
about leaving an associate position with a large firm" (citing Deborah K. Holmes, Struc-
tural Causes of Dissatisfaction Among Large-Firm Attorneys: A Feminist Perspective, 12
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 9, 23-24 (1990))); Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 86 n.100
(noting that "women exit law practice 60% 'more quickly' than men") (citing Fiona M.
Kay, Flight from Law: A Competing Risks Model of Departures from Law Firms, 31 L. &
Soc'Y REV. 301, 327 (1997)); cf Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
26, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 42 (discussing the phenomenon of professional women leav-
ing their careers in part because high-powered jobs in fields such as business and law do
not accommodate their needs).
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evidence of this phenomenon, concluding that "women in higher-paying,
male-dominated occupations are much less likely to remain ... than are
women in lower-paying female-dominated occupations .... Thus, just as
employers appear to have begun opening the doors to nontraditional jobs
to women, almost as many women have been leaving ... [as] entering."'
In short, discrimination continues to deprive women of opportuni-
ties, and women's expectations of that discrimination continue this cycle.
People typically "adapt their conduct and even their desires to what has
been available,' 65 a principle that rebuts the argument that occupational
segregation simply results from women's choices.
As discussed above, discrimination and expectations of discrimina-
tion explain a substantial portion of the workplace gender inequities and
disparities that continue to exist. The discrimination-plus-expectations
story, however, cannot fully explain gender disparities among fields, oc-
cupations, or particular employers, because, as the next Part discusses,
women often have little information about the extent of discrimination in
a given occupation or workplace. Like anyone making an important deci-
sion based on incomplete information, women may use, as a proxy for
the likelihood of discrimination, other more visible information-specifi-
cally, the number of women present in that particular occupation or
workplace. As later Parts discuss, such decisionmaking by women makes
gender disparities even more durable and self-perpetuating than previ-
ously realized.
III. WOMEN'S PREFERENCE FOR DIVERSE WORKPLACES:
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE
A. Use of Proxies Under Imperfect Information: The Example of
"Statistical Discrimination"
Many economic analyses discuss "statistical discrimination": dis-
crimination not because one dislikes a group but because one thinks its
members are more likely to cause certain costs or difficulties, such as em-
ployers discriminating against young women (fearing pregnancy leave) or
disabled workers (fearing accommodation costs). 6 6 Better employer in-
64 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1825-26 (citing J. JACOBS, REVOLVING
DOORS: SEX SEGREGATION AND WOMEN'S CAREERS 141-42 (1989)). Jacobs collects data
that shows "a disproportionate-and alarmingly high-rate of female attrition from male-
dominated occupations" as well as that women who leave jobs in male fields enter "fe-
male" fields more often than the reverse. Id. at 1825-26 nn.286-87.
65 Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
217, 236 (1993) [hereinafter Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences].
66 Some claims of statistical discrimination are dishonest or at least inaccurate. See
Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 202-03 (noting that "employer assertions that discrimi-
nation is based on real costs may be pretexts for bigotry .... The pretext is transparent
when discrimination is blatantly overinclusive or underinclusive toward the asserted non-
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formation (e.g., whether a certain individual with a medical condition
will require accommodations) could mitigate employer concerns, but it is
often impractical or illegal to obtain such information (e.g., about preg-
nancy plans) in the hiring process.67 Even when employers do ask such
questions, employees may lie or genuinely may not know certain infor-
mation in advance (e.g., whether a woman will become pregnant or whether
a disability will worsen and then require accommodation). Moreover,
employers can invest only so much time and effort in the hiring process;
they often "do not have the resources to examine the individual ... ap-
plicants, and instead make judgments based on group affiliations."68
Judgments based on group affiliation risk inaccuracy, yet they may
still be profit-maximizing. While complete information yields more accu-
rate decisions, it is costly (or impossible) to obtain-a difficulty that in-
duces employers to resort to statistical discrimination.69 Employers
"economize[ ] on the costs of information"7 by making decisions based
on easily visible characteristics, such as gender or age, rather than harder-to-
obtain individualized information. If the visible characteristic correlates
reasonably well with whatever cost the employer seeks to avoid, it is
profit-maximizing to discriminate.7 The inaccurate decisions that result
from statistical discrimination do impose a cost on employers-the loss
of a well-qualified member of the disfavored group. However, that cost
may not be great enough to deter employers from discriminating.72
Statistical discrimination is an example of how, "[i]n the face of in-
complete information on individual applicants, employers rely on their
reasoning, intuition, and background knowledge to fill in the blanks."73
bigoted end, but this is rare."). Other times, statistical judgments may be exaggerated
stereotypes because psychological limitations bias estimates of probabilities. Id. at 207.
Employers also might overestimate negative qualities of a discriminated-against group due
to cognitive biases that "make[ ] stereotypical views self-reinforcing": the "availability
heuristic" causes people to "extrapolate not from a random sample of information, but only
from what [they] happen to hear." Id. This bias is exacerbated by the "confirmation bias,"
which makes people "not equally open to all information, but more open to that which
comfortably confirms their views." Id. at 208.
67 See, e.g., Senuta v. City of Groton, No. 3:01 -CV-475, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10792,
at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 5, 2002) (awarding injunctive relief to a woman claiming she was
denied a firefighter job in favor of men ranked lower on an eligibility list). During the job
interview, the defendant asked the plaintiff numerous questions about her family life, such
as her childcare arrangements. Id.
68 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 64; see also Cooter, supra note 35, at 157-58
(discussing discrimination based on imperfect information, where the employer knows
little about the employee).
69 See Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 64; Cooter, supra note 35, at 157-58; ROB-
ERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS § 5.3, at 164 (5th ed. 2001).
'o POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 11.7, at 368.
71 See id. § 26.5, at 725; PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 69, § 5.3, at 164; Moss &
Malin, supra note 25, at 202.
72 See infra Part IV.B.2.c (discussing how the cost of rectifying discrimination may be
high enough to reinforce tendencies to discriminate).
71 Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 207.
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The following Parts discuss this same phenomenon at work in employee
decisionmaking: in the face of incomplete information on individual em-
ployers, applicants rely on their reasoning, intuition, and background
knowledge to fill in the blanks.
B. Reverse Statistical Discrimination: Female Employees'
"Discrimination" Against Employers with an Underrepresention
of Women
According to economic theory, an employer offering employees
something better than other employers do (e.g., better salary, retirement
plan, or work environment) tries to market itself to workers by disclosing,
or signaling, that trait. Even if firms with gender discrimination problems
try to hire as many women at the same wages as nondiscriminatory firms,
Charny and Gulati have reasoned that "employees will migrate towards
the firms that signal themselves as fairer."74 The question becomes how
employers can signal fairness and how women can detect such signals.
Current antidiscrimination law has made such signaling increasingly diffi-
cult.
1. Female Job Applicants'Information Problem: The Difficulty of
Knowing Which Workplaces Discriminate
a. Limited Employee Resources for Researching and Applying
for Jobs
As discussed above, employers engage in statistical discrimination
because of several limitations on their information about job applicants.
Employers lack (1) unlimited resources to interview all applicants, (2) infi-
nite time, money, or ability to research the leading candidates, and (3) the
ability to foresee whether better candidates will apply.
Job applicants are in much the same position as employers: they
must make employment decisions in the face of limited information. They
lack (1) unlimited resources to interview with all employers, (2) infinite
time, money, or ability to research the leading candidates, and (3) the
ability to foresee when they have a job offer whether better offers will
arrive.75
7 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 94.
7 See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 510-12 (discussing ways in which "in-
formation about job opportunities ... is imperfect," and how this results in (1) mismatches
of employers and employees, (2) "search unemployment" (i.e., remaining unemployed
while searching for a job or holding out for better offers), and (3) "underemployment"
(i.e., the opposite of search unemployment-taking an inferior job due to the uncertain
odds of finding a better one)).
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In this sense of having to ration finite job search resources, female job
applicants are, ironically enough, in the same position as employers who
engage in statistical discrimination. Because of their "limited resources to
devote to looking for work," they have to distinguish, or "sort," prospective
employers to focus their job search efforts.7 6 However, applicants are
likely to have difficulty sorting based on a preference to avoid discrimi-
nation.
b. The Difficulty of Spotting Discrimination
Job applicants are largely unknown quantities to employers, and the
reverse is also true. When workers first enter an occupation, they "have
much less information about the reputations" of employers than they
would like." Absent information on how a new workplace treats women,
female applicants may fall back on "knowledge of the pervasiveness of
stereotypes and discrimination in society at large. ' 78 However, this as-
sumption that workplaces treat women in the same manner as society at
large does not help workers distinguish among fields or employers. To
make such judgments, workers need to know how one field or employer
compares to another.
It is not easy for applicants to discern which workplaces discrimi-
nate. Anecdotal evidence may exist, 79 but such information is limited and
not a comprehensive examination of an entire occupation or labor mar-
ket. Anecdotes are also of questionable accuracy because they typically
spread slowly and do not include the date of occurrence. As a result, an-
ecdotes may be both too slow in circulating to reflect the latest events
and too slow to cease circulating when out of date. Workplaces and oc-
cupations can change substantially in their inclusion of women,80 ren-
dering discrimination anecdotes untrustworthy. Thus, anecdotes are an
inadequate way to determine which employers discriminate.
76 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 73 (noting that, among other methods, employ-
ees sort by assessing their odds of success at obtaining particularly competitive and desir-
able jobs).
77 Pompian, supra note 48, at 547.
78/d.
79 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
80 Not long ago, for example, almost all law firms would have appeared on the list of
occupations with fewer than five percent women. Now, however, twenty-nine percent of
lawyers are female. David E. Steinberg, More of the Same: Elitism and Exclusion at the
AALS Annual Meeting, 54 ME. L. REV. 251, 270 (2002) (citing 2001 data from the U.S.
DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYED PERSONS DETAILED BY OCCU-
PATION, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 177 (200 1), available at http:/www.bls.gov/cps/
cpsaatl l.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004)). Furthermore, "roughly half the entering employ-
ees are women" in law firms today. Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal
Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV.
WOMEN'S L. J. 77, 88 (2003).
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Another problem with such information is that anecdotes rarely re-
veal whether discrimination was the true reason behind a woman's failing
to receive a particular job-and workplace segregation makes it harder to
unearth the true reason. As Judge J. Skelley Wright noted two decades
ago, "[t]he days of Bull Connor are largely past; discrimination now
works more subtly."'" Because antidiscrimination laws by now are well-
known, discrimination has gone underground; "'employers are rarely so
cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file' that the firing is
for a reason forbidden by law."8 2 Absent such a smoking gun, discrimina-
tion is most provable when there are directly comparable male and fe-
male candidates whom the employer treated differently. 3 But often there
is no one directly comparable. "[T]he more segregated the labor force,
the more difficult it is to find comparative evidence illustrating discrimi-
natory, disparate treatment." 4 As discussed elsewhere, many workplaces
and occupations are heavily gender-segregated,8" so an employer faces
"the choice ... between a male and a female candidate ... less often
than one would think."
8 6
It is especially hard to spot discrimination in certain contexts. In high-
wage jobs, evaluations of performance, skill, and qualifications are highly
subjective, making it difficult to show that an employer passed up a "bet-
ter" female or minority worker.87 And in "high-skill or knowledge intensive
jobs in which the discretionary, skill-based component of work creates
substantial difficulty in monitoring individual workers' performance,"
employers often solve that difficulty by paying "efficiency wages"88-
above-market wages intended to generate a large applicant pool and make
employees more eager.89 By design, efficiency wages yield a "surplus of
8I Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
82 Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985)).
83 See, e.g., Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a
Title VII plaintiff may raise the requisite "inference of discrimination ... by showing that
the employer subjected him to disparate treatment, that is, treated him less favorably than a
similarly situated employee outside his protected group"); Shumway v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 118 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a female Title VII plaintiff's prima
facie case "may be proven by showing that a man similarly situated was treated differ-
ently").
14 Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 211 n.93 (citing John J. Donohue III & Peter
Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 983, 1012 (1991)).
85 See supra notes 12-13, infra note 217. and accompanying text.
86 Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12, at 292.
'7 See, e.g., Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 98 (noting that "hard-to-observe, subtle
discrimination in high-level jobs . . . is near impossible to prove where the [employment]
decision involves a large number of similarly qualified individuals and subjective
qualifications").
88 Id. at 60-61. "So long as the extra benefit in terms of inducing effort or attracting
high ability workers is greater than the extra wages, this is a rational profit-maximizing
strategy ... ." Id. at 75.
89 See generally EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 359-62 (defining and explain-
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equally competent" workers,9" challenging the idea that free markets de-
ter discrimination. With surplus labor available, discrimination is cheap,
both because it is more difficult to spot and because another worker eas-
ily can replace the discriminated-against worker.9"
In cases of discrimination against women based on pregnancy or
parental responsibilities, examining employers' treatment of comparable
men is difficult. There is obviously no man directly comparable, and lik-
ening pregnancy to a different medical condition is an imperfect com-
parison.9 2 In cases of discrimination against mothers based on parental
responsibilities, a comparison could be made to men with similar respon-
sibilities, but men on average still perform far fewer childcare tasks than
do women. 93 In sum, job applicants' knowledge of which employers dis-
criminate is likely to be very limited. Anecdotal knowledge is of ques-
tionable accuracy, and it is difficult to know whether a particular termi-
nation or failure to hire was based on discrimination.
c. The Lack of Effective Signals of Employer Nondiscrimination: An
Unintended Consequence of Judicial Micromanagement of
the Workplace
The flip side of discrimination being easy for employers to hide is
that nondiscrimination is hard for employers to signal. Employers do not
admit discriminating, and "good" employer policies tend to be uninforma-
tive recitations of basic law-a peculiar result of increasing legal for-
malization of equal employment standards. One way for an employer to
signal gender fairness would be to publicize its enlightened policies on
discrimination, employee leave, and affirmative action. Virtually all ma-
jor employers have antidiscrimination policies, and while not all have
ing efficiency wages); PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 69. § 17.6, at 616-18 (explain-
ing how the efficiency wage theory can explain the causes of wage discrimination and
unemployment): cf POSNER. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. supra note 24, § 26.1, at 370 n.4 (not-
ing that above-market payments to an agent is one solution to the "principal-agent" prob-
lem).
90 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 78.
I9 d. at 95 (asserting that "underemployment ...creat[es] a pool of workers that per-
mits firms to discriminate without suffering economic loss"). More generally, wages that
are above-market for any reason-efficiency wages, union contracts, wage laws-create
excess labor supply, which allows jobs to be allocated by noneconomic criteria such as
nepotism, race, or gender. See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 26.1, at 717.
92 A similar problem exists for disability discrimination, which is difficult to prove
with comparisons to other employees, both "because of the heterogeneity of the disabled"
and because "the non-disabled rarely ask for accommodations the disabled are denied."
Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 211.
93 Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707, 709
(2000) (drawing on evidence that "[w]orking women ... continue to perform between two
to three times as much housework as men [and] remain overwhelmingly responsible for
child rearing").
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maternity leave options or affirmative action measures, those that do of-
ten disclose them in job postings.94
Increased legal scrutiny of such employment policies, however, has
made them a far less useful signal than they once were. Recent Supreme
Court decisions have induced all major firms, including those that dis-
criminate, to adopt equal employment opportunity ("EEO") policies, es-
sentially creating a judicially imposed "minimum" nondiscrimination
policy. Recent decisions and legislation have also set "maximum" ele-
ments of EEO policies: the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")
provides a standard employee leave policy under federal law,95 and courts
have sounded a cautious tone regarding affirmative action,96 imposing
restrictions likely to limit employers' freedom to maintain or expand
affirmative action policies. These trends in externally mandated antidis-
crimination measures have made it more difficult for employees to infer
anything meaningful about a workplace from its policies.
i. Judicially Set "Minimum" EEO Policies: Case Law Allowing
Employers To Use EEO Policies as Affirmative Defenses to
Discrimination/Harassment Liability
Over the years since the enactment of Title VII, 97 major employers
have adopted EEO policies, which typically include: (1) promises of
nondiscriminatory treatment, (2) affirmative action policies, (3) discrimina-
tion complaint procedures, and (4) employee sensitivity/antidiscrimina-
tion training.98 Increasingly, the Supreme Court has made employers' Ti-
tle VII liability turn on the quality of their EEO policies.
94 See, e.g., NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 8 (containing postings from all major cor-
porate law firms that engage in on-campus recruiting of law students and providing numer-
ous examples of employers offering employees maternity and paternity leave). E.g., id. at
1286 (Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP offering "13 weeks paid Maternity Leave"); id. at
1284 (Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP offering "maternity leave"); id. at 1285 (Cahill
Gordon & Reindel offering "maternity and paternity leave"). A number of firms, however,
provide significantly longer parental leave for mothers than for fathers, reflecting and rein-
forcing the expectation that women are (and should be) the primary caregivers; e.g.. id. at
1286 (Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP offers "13 weeks paid maternity leave" but only "I
week paid Paternity Leave"); id. at 1292 (Covington & Burling offers "3 months mater-
nity" but only "2 weeks parental" leave).
95 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
96 See infra Part III.B. l.c.ii.
97 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (2002).
98 Small businesses are less likely to have formal EEO policies, employee handbooks,
or training seminars. But almost all mid- to large-sized businesses have such policies now,
even those firms notorious for rampant gender discrimination. Compare, e.g., Morgan
Stanley, Equal Employment Opportunity, http://www.morganstanley.com/careers/equal-
empl.html (2002-03) (last visited Feb. 1, 2004) (asserting that "Morgan Stanley is an equal
opportunity employer and does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, gen-
der, sexual orientation, national origin, age, citizenship, disability, marital status, preg-
nancy, veteran status or any other characteristic protected by law"), with EEOC Letter of
Determination, EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc, Charge No. 160-99-0423 (June 5,
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In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton99 and Burlington Industries v. El-
lerth,1°° the Court placed EEO policies at the heart of the employer's de-
fense in hostile work environment cases. The Court held that an employer
is strictly liable for sexual harassment by supervisors unless the employer
proves "(a) that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff em-
ployee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or cor-
rective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm other-
wise."' 0'
Immediately after Faragher and Ellerth, lower courts made clear that
an employer goes a long way towards meeting its burden, delineated in
the first part of the Faragher test, by simply promulgating an antiharass-
ment policy and publicizing it to all employees (absent evidence of a
specific need for other prevention or correction measures). 02 Antidis-
crimination training for managers and employees can also help an em-
ployer meet its burden, especially to the extent that the training directly
evidences implementation of an antiharassment/EEO policy.° 3
The year after Faragher and Ellerth, the Court in Kolstad v. Ameri-
can Dental Ass'n' 4 created a similar affirmative defense to punitive dam-
ages liability applicable to both discrimination and harassment claims.
Kolstad "insulates an employer from punitive damages liability if it has
made 'good faith efforts to enforce an antidiscrimination policy.' This
defense requires an employer to establish both that it had an antidis-
2000) (concluding, after investigation including witness interviews, review of subpoenaed
documents, and extensive briefing, that Morgan Stanley "subjected . .. a class of ... fe-
male employees . .. to a pattern and practice of discrimination because of their sex ...
[including] disparate treatment regarding compensation, promotions, and terms and condi-
tions of employment," as well as retaliation for reporting discrimination), and EEOC Let-
ter of Determination, EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc, Charge No. 160-AO-2451 (Mar.
7, 2001) (concluding, after investigation of follow-up charges, that Morgan Stanley further
"engaged in retaliation and sex discrimination ... in violation of Title VII" after the first
determination issued).
9524 U.S. 775 (1998).
o 524 U.S. 742 (1998). Faragher and Ellerth were decided simultaneously.
101 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
102 See, e.g., Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999);
Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 862 (9th Cir. 1999); Savino v. C.P. Hall Co., 199
F.3d 925, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1999). Merely having a sexual harassment policy is not always
sufficient. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Sheffler Enters., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1003 (W.D. Mo.
1998) (denying defendant summary judgment because solely issuing harassment policy to
employee is insufficient to establish a reasonable effort to prevent and correct harassment
and to enforce the policy when complaints arise).
"3See, e.g., Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 812 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding that
periodic training sessions for managers on company harassment policies, guidelines, and
complaint procedures "establish[ed], as a matter of law, that AutoZone exercised reason-
able care to prevent sexual harassment"); Hollis v. City of Buffalo, 28 F. Supp. 2d 812,
821-22 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding for plaintiff because defendant had no harassment policy
at the time of the harassment, made no real response to plaintiff's complaints, and had no
mandatory harassment training).
1-' 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
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crimination policy and made [a] good faith effort to enforce it."' 5 Kolstad
echoed the Faragher/Ellerth pronouncement that company EEO policies
carry great weight in Title VII cases: "The purposes underlying Title VII
are similarly advanced where employers are encouraged to adopt antidis-
crimination policies and to educate their personnel on Title VII's prohi-
bitions."'06
Thus, the Court has allowed employers to use EEO policies to de-
fuse the significant threat of liability in hostile work environment cases
and punitive damages in all kinds of discrimination cases. The Court thereby
has increased the incentive for employers to adopt the antidiscrimination
policies, trainings, and grievance procedures that are standard fare in
corporate EEO policies.'07
While genuine antidiscrimination efforts certainly benefit employ-
ees, Susan Sturm has noted "the risk that employers will adopt legalistic,
sham, or symbolic internal processes that leave underlying patterns of
bias unchanged."'0 8 For example, "[m]any of the internal dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms developed by employers ... consist of boilerplate from
the most recent decisions of the court or the reproduction of EEOC
guidelines."'" Virtually all law firms, for instance, publish identical-
sounding EEO policies, with standard promises of equal treatment and
assertions of nondiscriminatory decisionmaking." ° This seems to be
enough to protect employers from liability, as "[s]ome courts have de-
ferred to an employer's procedures, regardless of their actual effective-
105 Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 251 F.3d 376, 385-86 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 546) (citations omitted) (holding that employer failed to
establish a Kolstad defense where it did "not establish as a matter of law the existence of
such a policy, much less good faith enforcement of such a policy").
106 Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 545.
107 See, e.g., Hatley v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 308 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming
the district court's refusal to allow a jury to award punitive damages against Bally's which
was shielded by its "good faith effort to prevent sexual harassment .... as is evidenced by
the fact that [it] had a well-publicized policy forbidding sexual harassment, gave training
on sexual harassment to new employees, established a grievance procedure for sexual har-
assment complaints, and initiated an investigation of the plaintiffs' complaints").
108 Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 490 (2001). Susan Bisom-Rapp has recounted defense
attorneys' efforts "to strategically position employers" to protect them from litigation and
the frequency of "symbolic rather than substantive" compliance with EEO law. Susan Bisom-
Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment Discrimination
Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 961, 963, 965, 966 (1999) (presenting a "con-
tent analysis of the defense literature advocating preventative practices" and exposing the
creation of an "appearance of nondiscriminatory decision making without an equivalent
emphasis on facilitating substantive change for protected groups. In other words, the de-
fense bar speaks to employers in symbolic terms.").
109 Sturm, supra note 108, at 543.
110 See, e.g., NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 8, at 1293 ("It is the policy and practice of
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP to provide equal employment and advancement opportuni-
ties to all persons without regard to race, color, creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, national
origin, marital, parental or veteran status or physical disability."). Almost all firms in the
Directory have virtually identical statements. See id. passim.
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ness in eliminating ... discrimination.... [This] uncritical acceptance of
internal dispute resolution processes legitimates purely formalistic solu-
tions . .. ."I"
In light of this case law, an employer's tough-sounding EEO policy
might signal deep concern for equality, but it might also be simply a tac-
tical decision, adopted on advice of counsel and designed to protect the
employer from liability. In fact, the more discrimination at a firm, the
more lawsuits it can expect to face, and thus the greater the "return on
investment" for paying pricey lawyers to draft an EEO policy satisfying
Kolstad and Faragher/Ellerth. The worst discriminators therefore have
the greatest incentive to adopt the best-sounding EEO policies. Given the
likelihood that the most nondiscriminatory and the most discriminatory
firms will have similar-sounding EEO policies, such policies can no
longer serve as useful signals of employers' concern for equality.
ii. Judicially Set "Maximum" EEO Policies: Judicial Proscription of
Workplace Affirmative Action
In direct contrast to the minimum EEO policies set by decisions such
as Kolstad and Faragher/Ellerth, the limitations courts have imposed on
affirmative action" 2 can be considered a maximum limit on employers'
EEO policies and efforts. The Supreme Court has narrowed the circum-
stances in which affirmative action is permissible,' 13 and attorneys for
"I Sturm, supra note 108, at 537-58.
112 See, e.g., Pompian, supra note 48, at 560-61 (recounting, before the 2003 Supreme
Court affirmative action decisions, judicial restrictions on affirmative action and noting
that -[g]eneral evidence of discrimination or of stereotypes that persist within society as a
whole, or even within a national industry, is necessarily insufficient" to be the "invidious
grounds" on which an affirmative action policy can be based); Adams, supra note 58, at
1122-52 (reiterating such insufficiency and adding that affirmative action has been held
impermissible even in such limited forms as regulations mandating outreach programs or
aggressive litigation remedies).
"I In 1996. the Supreme Court held that governmental affirmative action based on race
faces strict scrutiny and therefore must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling govern-
mental interest. See Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1996). Subsequent appellate
court decisions invalidating affirmative action programs were followed by Gratz v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), both challenges
to the University of Michigan's programs for affirmative action in student admissions.
Gratz invalidated the undergraduate affirmative action program, deeming that it went too
far in assigning applicants a substantial number of admissions points based on race. 539
U.S. 281-83. Grutter, in contrast, upheld the law school affirmative action program, which
considered applicants on a more individualized basis. 539 U.S. 336. Grutter's permissive-
ness may be narrowly limited to the academic setting, since the Court asserted that the
principle of academic freedom contributed to its deference to the University. See Frank
Scruggs & Joe Reeder, Greenberg Traurig, LLP. Supreme Court Decisions in the Univer-
sity of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases Have Important Implications for Employers,
Federal Contractors, and Institutions Across the Fabric of American Life (July 2003),
available at http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2003/scruggsf_07.asp (last visited Feb. 1,
2004).
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employers are advising their clients to exercise caution in adopting any
affirmative action policies and to review carefully any current programs. 114
Before the Supreme Court began to restrict affirmative action, em-
ployers could send particularly clear signals of concern for equality by
engaging in aggressive affirmative action. Affirmative action could in-
crease female and minority hiring by drawing more women or minorities
from the applicant pool, but it could also have dynamic effects. Affirmative
action can induce more women and minorities to apply because it is "a
valuable means of signaling to potential applicants" the employer's "high
value on diversity."' 5 Thus, as voluntary affirmative action becomes rarer
due to the Supreme Court's restrictions, another formerly useful signal to
job applicants concerned about gender discrimination is vanishing.
The irony here is that the judicial declarations of minimum and
maximum EEO policies are purportedly conservative policies, in the
sense of limiting employers' liability for inequality and responsibility to
redress it. Yet these precedents heavily regulate and distort employers'
decisions about how to run their workplaces. Where there once existed a
wide range of antidiscrimination and affirmative action policies, there is
now a judicially imposed set of workplace rules. While serving the con-
servative goal of minimizing employer liability, these decisions fly in the
face of the older conservative exhortation that "[c]ourts are generally less
competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless
mandated to do so by Congress they should not attempt it."' 6 Indeed,
when courts reject employment discrimination claims, they regularly in-
voke just these sorts of old bromides, such as the admonition that courts
not serve as "super-personnel departments," monitoring employment de-
cisionmaking.' 7 When constructing liability shields for employers, how-
14 E.g., Scruggs & Reeder, supra note 113 (predicting that "some organizations now
may forebear from adopting [affirmative action] .... [or] use these decisions carefully to
assess potential liabilities and to refine their policies"), available at http://www.gtlaw.com/
pub/alerts/2003/scruggsf__07.asp; Jackson Lewis LLP, Court Rulings Stress National
Importance of Diversitv Goals but Set Limits on Methods (June 24, 2003) (noting that the
"Supreme Court leaves unanswered whether courts will continue to hold that affirmative
action or diversity preferences . . . in the employment context can be implemented only to
remedy past or present discrimination" and cautioning employers that "[alffirmative action
or diversity programs that provide financial incentives or rewards to managers for diversity
successes are particularly at risk"), available at http://www.jacksonlewis.com/legalupdates/
article.cfm?aid=423 (last visited Feb. I, 2004).
0 Pompian, supra note 48, at 556.
Waters v. Furnco Constr. Co., 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).
"7 E.g., Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 790 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that "we do not sit
as a super-personnel department over employers scrutinizing and second-guessing every
decision they make"); Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 781 (8th Cir.
1995) ("the employment-discrimination laws have not vested in the federal courts the
authority to sit as super-personnel departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the
business judgments made by employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve
intentional discrimination").
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ever, many courts remain aggressive micromanagers unconcerned about
judicial intrusion into workplace policy.
iii. Legislation Setting a Standard Package of Accommodations
Oddly, employers' abilities to signal their fairness to job applicants
are diminished not only by judicial decisions limiting employer responsi-
bility for workplace inequality, but also by legislative enactments in-
creasing employer responsibility for workplace inequality. The FMLA,
for example, mandates up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for an em-
ployee who has a "serious medical condition" or is caring for a relative
with such a condition." 8 The FMLA covers both men and women but was
expressly conceived as an effort to force employers to accommodate women
in the workplace" 9 by allowing them to return to jobs after taking time
off for pregnancy, caregiving, and homemaking responsibilities that
women, even when they also work outside the home, continue to under-
take more often than men. 20
The FMLA, however, may not have raised the floor of employee
leave benefits for some employees, and it may have set an unofficial
ceiling. Michael Selmi has noted that before the FMLA, employee leave
benefits were common but quite varied; federal survey data show that "a
majority of large employers . . . provided some form of leave before the
passage of the FMLA ... to take time off around the birth of a child."'
2'
The most common forms were paid sick leave, unpaid maternity leave,
and disability plan coverage for pregnancy. 22 Some firms offered benefits
well above the FMLA minimum: employees working in medium- to large-
size companies for at least five years received an average of nine weeks
of fully paid leave.2 3 In addition, some states mandated leave benefits
more generous than the FMLA's, including wage replacement during
leave. 1
24
18 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2003).
119 As delineated in 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2004), the purposes of the FMLA are not
only to help employees "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families"
(§ 2601(b)(1)) and take time off for "medical reasons" (§ 2601(b)(2)) but also to "mini-
mize the potential for employment discrimination on the basis of sex" (§ 2601(b)(4)) and
"promote the goal of equal employment opportunity for women and men" (§ 2601(b)(5)).
Even the family and medical purposes (§§ 2601(b)(1),(2)) reflect gender equity goals, as
the statute's "Findings" make clear: "due to the nature of the roles of men and women in
our society, the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on women, and
such responsibility affects the working lives of women more than it affects the working
lives of men." 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (a)(5) (2004).
120 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
121 Selmi, supra note 93, at 762.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 763.
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Thus, before the FMLA, a firm's generous family/pregnancy leave
provisions could serve as a useful signal of genuine efforts to facilitate
the entry and retention of female employees. The FMLA's passage, how-
ever, raised the less sensitive employers' leave policies up to a statutory
minimum. As a result, such firms' inclination to offer stingy family/preg-
nancy leave is no longer readily apparent, eliminating another potential
signal to workers concerned about gender equity.
While the FMLA increased family/medical leave rights in some
workplaces, it
may also have preempted the development of more friendly
policies in the private sector. Prior to the ... FMLA, there ap-
peared to be a modest trend by private employers to provide in-
creasingly generous paid leave policies, a trend that now seems
to have stalled as the federal legislation has become the ceiling
of benefits.'25
In fact, the enactment of the FMLA has resulted in family leave reform
vanishing from legislatures' and unions' agendas. 126 Except for California,
which in 2002 passed a law mandating paid leave, no state has passed
significant legislation since the FMLA's enactment, and the relevant po-
tential lobbies have been "likely to move on to other issues."'27
To the extent that it has preempted or slowed any trend by firms,
unions, or states to provide more generous leave, the FMLA has in effect
imposed an unofficial ceiling limiting what many employers might come
to provide. By creating a mandatory floor and an unofficial ceiling on
employee leave benefits, the FMLA has diminished the range of variation
among firms' leave policies, thereby lessening such policies' value as
signaling mechanisms.
iv. Employer Signals Reduced to "Cheap Talk"
As discussed above, employers' EEO, affirmative action, and fam-
ily/medical leave policies no longer serve as effective signals of employer
fairness. The resulting information problem for employees is similar to a
long-noted information problem for employers: because employee talent
and effort is hard to discern in advance, employers end up skeptical of
the "large number of noisy and false signals"'28 from employees. The re-
sult is a "pooling equilibrium": 29 even though employees vary, employ-
25 Id. at 767.
126 Id. at 766.
127 Id.
128 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 82.
129 Id.
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ers assume each new employee to have about the same talent and work
ethic as the average worker in the labor pool. 30
Similarly, employer policies have degenerated from useful employer
signaling to a form of "cheap talk"-boasts that are "profitable because
of the low odds of being caught and the immense gain in respectability
(and legality)" of claiming fairness.' Employee assessments of employ-
ers' fairness have, as a result, degenerated into a pooling equilibrium,
with employees assuming that one employer has about the same odds of
discriminating as another.
2. The Solution to Women's Information Problem: Using the
Percentage of Women in a Workplace as a Proxy for Employers'
Treatment of Women
As previously discussed, in recent years both overt discrimination
and variation among employers' EEO, affirmative action, and employee
leave policies have decreased, reducing their signaling value to employ-
ees. Thus, women must utilize other criteria to predict which occupations
or particular employers are more likely to treat female employees well.
One such criterion that female job applicants can employ is the per-
centage of a workforce that is female132-a figure that can serve as a
proxy for the presence of discrimination. In several ways, the number of
women in a workplace correlates to the likelihood of gender discrimina-
tion. First, and most obviously, discriminatory hiring and promotion
practices may be the reason there are few women in a given workplace.
Second, hostile work environments are far more likely in workplaces
with fewer women. And third, even absent conscious discrimination or
hostility, workplaces with fewer women are more likely to feature gendered
norms favoring men and to advantage men in other subtle but important
ways.
110 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. supra note 24, § 26.5, at 726 (discussing how a
pooling equilibrium, in which employers judge employees by race, can occur in the context
of racial preferences if higher-performing employees find it "difficult to separate them-
selves" from lower-performing employees); ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR AP-
PLIED ECONOMISTS 194-99 (1992) (discussing circumstances in which workers' job-market
signaling yields a pooling, or "partially pooling," equilibrium).
131 Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 203; see generally ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS
WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS 96-113 (discussing signaling
generally and how signals can degenerate into "cheap talk" if easy to fake); GIBBONS, SU-
pra note 130, at 210-13.
132 Sturm has collected examples of just such behavior. Sturm, supra note 108, at 497-
98 (recounting that reform at Deloitte & Touche, the nation's third largest accounting, tax,
and management consulting firm, which dramatically increased the female percentage of
its workforce, "produced swift and observable results, both in women's participation and in
the firm's overall retention rate[,] . . . [and] has itself become an effective recruiting tool");
id. at 514 (recounting that at Home Depot, before reforms spurred by a class action law-
suit, women gravitated toward positions more populated by women, such as cashier jobs,
because, in the words of one woman, "I thought that's where women went").
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a. The Rationality of the Assumption That Discrimination May Have
Caused the Underrepresentation of Women
Female job applicants may see gender disparities among workplaces,
but they may not know why such disparities exist. One reason could be
that the firms with fewer women discriminated against women in hiring
and promotions. This commonsense point is reflected in the case law
viewing significant underrepresentations of women as prima facie evi-
dence of discrimination.'3 3 Another possibility is that because women
still bear disproportionate childcare responsibilities,'34 they opt against
certain work requiring extremely long hours.'35 Joan Williams argues that
failing to accommodate childcare responsibilities may be a form of dis-
crimination; 3 6 yet even if it does not constitute judicially recognized
"discrimination," it is still a form of inhospitability to women.
Another possible cause of workplace gender disparities is unequal
attrition, even absent any hiring discrimination. If an employer hires
equal numbers of men and women, but women have higher attrition rates,
that workforce will become male-dominated over time. Hostile work en-
vironments and other intangible discriminatory acts, such as discrimina-
tory evaluations, are one reason for higher female attrition; in male-
dominated workplaces, hostility to female workers may subvert women's
performance or otherwise induce women to leave.'37
Gender disparities also may arise from random chance or nondis-
criminatory causes, but applicants may not know whether a specific un-
derrepresentation resulted from discrimination. Yet because discrimina-
tion is a possible cause, it is rational, given their uncertainty, for women
to avoid workplaces with underrepresentations of women.
b. The Reverse of the Basic Assumption That Discrimination Causes
Disparities: Disparities Cause Discrimination
When a gender disparity exists, women may rationally assume that
discrimination caused the disparity. Yet the opposite is true as well: a
lack of women in the workplace can cause, or at least facilitate, discrimi-
nation. In predominantly male workplaces, stereotyping women as inca-
pable of performing "men's work" is more frequent, hostile work envi-
ronments are more common, and subjective, informal decisionmaking
favoring men over women is more likely. To the extent that gender dis-
"I See infra Part VI.A. L.a.
114 See Selmi, supra note 93, at 709, 729.
'3- See infra text accompanying notes 243-247 (discussing WILLIAMS, UNBENDING
GENDER).
136 See Williams & Segal, supra note 80, at 90-102.
117 See supra Part ll.B.2.b.
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parities cause discrimination, avoiding male-dominated workplaces is a
rational strategy for female job applicants.
i. The Ease of Stereotyping in Traditionally Male Jobs and the
"Lack of Interest" Defense
When states prohibited women from practicing law, it was easy for
the Supreme Court to reject a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the
Illinois ban on women attorneys because "[t]he paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society must
be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based
upon exceptional cases."' 38 The Illinois law and other similar state laws
prevented any women from becoming counterexamples and thus from
disproving that stereotype. Many have viewed stereotyping exactly this
way-as a result of inaccurate information that lessens in diverse set-
tings, where those holding inaccurate stereotypes are exposed to counter-
examples.139
Economists tend to view discriminatory preferences-distaste for
other groups-as a distinct phenomenon from stereotyping, and they as-
sume tastes are fixed, not the product of current conditions.'40 An alterna-
tive view of discriminatory preferences is that they are a product of living in
a nondiverse environment and can change as the environment changes.
Noneconomic analyses long have noted that desegregation decreases
prejudice. 4 ' Even economic analysis is capable of analyzing bigotry as
an "information market failure[ ]." Under this view, people's perceptions
are skewed because they receive and selectively process biased informa-
tion.'42 These biased perceptions can then produce and reinforce bigoted
"I Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141-42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
39 See, e.g., Barbara Reskin, Feminist Justice, at Home and Abroad: Imagining Work
Without Exclusionary Barriers, 14 YALE J.L. & FEM. 313, 324 (2002).
40 E.g., Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 201-08 (discussing the standard economic
account of discriminatory preferences, discrimination based on perceptions of actual group
differences, and ways in which those perceptions may be inaccurate stereotypes).
'41 E.g., MARTHA MINow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF 127 & n.599 (1997) (asserting that
"the literature on the efficacy of racial desegregation programs concludes that reduction of
racial prejudice is most affected by significant contact with members of other groups "un-
der conditions of equal status that emphasize common goals and deemphasize individual
and intergroup competition." Important kinds of contact include group academic projects
and shared membership on athletic teams .... Such joint activities are more effective than
instructing teaching about race relations and changing the curriculum to reflect multicul-
tural traditions, although such measures might also be useful." (quoting John B. McCona-
hay, Reducing Racial Prejudice in Desegregated Schools, in EFFECTIVE SCHOOL DESEGRE-
GATION: EQUITY. QUALITY AND FEASIBILITY 35 (Willis D. Hawley ed., 1981)).
142 See supra note 66 (discussing these biases and how they can produce inaccurate
stereotypes).
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views.'43 Thus, a lack of diversity may reinforce not only inaccurate stereo-
types but pure bigotry as well.
One example of disparities facilitating stereotypes is the success of
the "lack of interest" defense used by employers charged with discrimi-
nation. Schultz has collected examples of courts adopting stereotypes
that (in the words of one federal judge) "certain work ... is not attractive
to females. This is a fact of life that an Act of Congress cannot over-
come."'" Numerous courts have accepted employers' arguments that women
are underrepresented in higher-paying work not because of discrimina-
tion but because women lack interest in traditionally male jobs such as
retail sales,'45 bakery operations, 4 6 and manufacturing. 147 In the leading
"lack of interest" case, EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 ' the court ac-
cepted the employer's assertions "that the gendered characteristics Sears
ascribed to the commission sales position were an inherent, necessary
part of the job."'4 9 Sears's male-biased criteria reflected the characteristics
of the existing male-dominated workforce; the absence of women from the
workforce meant that they would be disfavored for not matching the pre-
vailing archetype of a commissioned salesman.
Even partial exclusion facilitates stereotyping by allowing excep-
tions to be written off as special cases, as in the Supreme Court decision
upholding a state's ban on women practicing law. 50 Furthermore, due to
stereotype threat,' it is hard for a woman in a male-dominated work-
place to excel as an "exception," further decreasing the likelihood of dis-
pelling stereotypes in such a workplace.
"I Moss & Malin, supra note 25. at 208 (citing Francis Kim. Discriminatory Tastes:
Social Darwinism and Discrimination in the Labor Market (1997) (unpublished manu-
script)).
"4EEOC v. Mead Foods, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1, 3 (W.D. Okla. 1977). The court ac-
cepted a bakery's failure to employ women on the rationale that the "hours and the nature
of the work are not appealing to women. In the less demanding work environments than
the baking operation and route service, Defendant's work force is generally heavy with
women . I..." Id. at 3-4; see also Schultz. Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1784 (discuss-
ing Mead Foods. 466 F. Supp. at 1).
145 See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. II1. 1986), aff'd. 839
F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
146 See supra note 144 (discussing Mead Foods, 466 F. Supp. at 1).
117 See EEOC v. Korn Indus., 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 954 (D.S.C. 1978), aff'd
on other grounds & remanded. 662 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1981); see also Schultz, Telling Sto-
ries, supra note 29, at 1784 (discussing Korn Industries, 17 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at
954).
148 Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1264.
119 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1805. Interestingly, the "gendered char-
acteristics" at issue reflected a stereotype of men. "Questions asked include: 'Do you have
a low pitched voice?' 'Do you swear often?' 'Have you ever done any hunting?' 'Have you
played on a football team?"' Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1300 n.29.
5 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
151 See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii.
[Vol. 27
Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces
ii. The Prevalence of Hostile Work Environments in Traditionally
Male Jobs
The fewer women in a workplace, the more likely it is that the work
environment will be hostile to women. The problem is greatest for women
entering male-dominated occupations, as Schultz has noted.'52 The hos-
tility often "is neither driven by the desire for sexual relations nor even
sexual in content"; rather, it is "designed to maintain work-particularly
the more highly rewarded lines of work-as bastions of masculine com-
petence and authority."' 53 Harassment thus can stem from men's desire to
preserve male-dominated fields by both driving out women who enter (with
hostility, sabotage, etc.) and marking the work as male territory (with
sexual images and indicia of male-dominated culture).
Michelle Adams has elaborated on the general principle of social psy-
chology that dominant-group members "often allocate resources to those
within their group and discriminate against outgroup members because to
do so contributes to their own individual self-conception."'54 Social psy-
chology theories such as "social identity theory" emphasize the tendency
to favor one's own group, which helps dominant groups perpetuate their
power. 5' Other theories focus on darker motivations, such as "realistic-
group-conflict theory" (i.e., groups have incompatible goals and compete
for scarce resources)'56 and "social dominance theory" (i.e., groups aim
to protect their privilege, power, and prestige). 57 Despite their differences
in focus, each of these theories helps explain the prevalence of hostility
to women in male-dominated workplaces.
High female attrition is the predictable result of hostility to women
in predominantly male workplaces.'5 8 As Schultz has described the phe-
nomenon, "harassment is ... driving the small number of women in nontra-
ditional jobs away."'59 Like other discrimination, harassment is a "power-
ful disincentive for women to move into and remain in nontraditional
occupations."'' 60 Thus, even if a gender disparity did not result from dis-
crimination, it can lead to discriminatory outcomes.
A strategy of gender-based hostility aimed at excluding women is
more feasible and more likely to succeed where women are already un-
derrepresented, sometimes even despite the presence of women in posi-
tions of authority. Presumably, women with authority would be less likely to
52 Schultz, Telling Stories. supra note 29, at 1834.
Schultz, Harassment, supra note 43, at 1687.
154 Adams, supra note 58, at 1152.
155 Id. at 1100-04.
15 6 Id. at 1104-06.
157 1 Id. at 1107-09.
"8 See Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1825 & n.286 (citing mobility studies
showing higher female attrition from higher-paying, male-dominated occupations).
159 1d. at 1834.
16
0 Id. at 1825.
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tolerate gender discrimination and harassment. However, in male-
dominated workplaces, the few women who make it to the top may spend
little effort improving conditions for future women.'
6'
iii. Subjective and Informal Decisionmaking That Favors Men
An additional problem in male-dominated workplaces is what might
be called "soft" discrimination-social networks favoring men and other
dominant groups in a workplace. Specifically, selection criteria that tend
to favor men, as well as word-of-mouth hiring and other informal deci-
sionmaking processes, reinforce gender disparities even absent any intent
to discriminate.'62 The classic example is the interviewer who begins job
interviews with questions aimed at determining whether the interviewer
and the applicant know people in common. Interviewers ask such ques-
tions, in the words of one interviewer at a major hiring conference, "to
see if [the applicants are] the same species" as the incumbents.
163
6 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 63, at 19-20 (citing a survey of female lawyers at a pre-
dominantly male law firm which reported "a belief among the associates that the women
who did achieve partnership did little to promote the opportunities and quality of life of
other women at the firm"). This phenomenon occurs in other settings as well. Susan Domi-
nus notes the comment by one female cadet regarding the numerous rapes reported at, but
essentially ignored by, the U.S. Air Force Academy:
Because women are a minority here, it's also important to see role models .... I
would point to a failure of the female leadership .... [The top-ranking woman]
was not visible. She never addressed the cadet wing; she just disappeared. I would
have said, "We cannot accept this." But that never happened. And we need a fe-
male role model who can provide good leadership.
Susan Dominus, Rape Crisis at the Academy, GLAMOUR, July 2003, at 200, 217 (alteration
in original).
162 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 58, at 1135 & n.287 (noting that word-of-mouth re-
cruiting may signal an "old boys' network" that gives limited opportunities to traditionally
excluded groups "by reaffirming the perception that a particular firm is dominated by
members of a particular group"); Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1813 (asserting
that "[w]ord-of-mouth recruiting signals to women that they would be unwelcome in an
occupational culture so masculinized that the employer relies on male employees to recruit
new workers through mostly male networks"); cf Banks v. City of Albany, 953 F. Supp. 28
(N.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying a defendant summary judgment on a claim that a fire depart-
ment's subjective hiring practices, based on personal ties, had a disparate impact on black
candidates).
153 These were the words of a middle-aged white male law professor at the October
2003 American Association of Law Schools ("AALS") Faculty Recruitment Conference.
The professor made this comment to a gathering of hundreds of applicants for law faculty
positions, as part of an AALS presentation purporting to explain the faculty hiring process
to applicants. If this professor is correct that shared connections are a hiring criterion, it is
perhaps unsurprising that women, though fairly well-represented among legal educators,
are significantly underrepresented in traditional (and coveted) tenure-track faculty posi-
tions filled through this AALS Faculty Recruitment Conference. See AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N
ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE OF WOMEN IN THE LAW 2 (2001)
(citing that women comprise 31.5% of law school faculties, but only 5.9% of tenured fac-
ulty members and 21.9% of full-time professors, while making up 46% of associate pro-
fessors and 48% of assistant professors), available at http://www.abanet.org/women/
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Male decisionmakers may tend to select job applicants and employ-
ees to mentor based on preexisting contacts and various commonalities
with those employees that correlate with gender. This has been the expe-
rience of women in the legal profession, for example, where "[w]omen
are often not mentored, and are frequently not included in important in-
formal and social contacts. This is particularly true in firms with few
women."'' "6 Similarly, white dominance is reinforced, Daria Roithmayr
has noted, by selection criteria that correlate with race, such as stan-
dardized testing, cultural experiences, and informal contacts. Decision-
makers perceive these measures to have nondiscriminatory utility as rea-
sonably good selection criteria-at least good enough to outweigh the
"switching costs" of changing the process. 16 5
In the context of gender, the problem is not so much tangible selec-
tion criteria, such as standardized testing and educational attainment, but
the subjectivity and informality of many employment decisions. Choices
among candidates ultimately entail a great deal of discretion-especially
to the extent that there is a surplus of similarly qualified candidates, whether
because of a depressed local economy or above-market efficiency wages
attracting a deep applicant pool. 6 6 Once employees are on the job, a sub-
stantial amount of training and mentoring is informal. Schultz has noted
that this is true of "virtually all training" in traditionally male blue-collar
jobs, 6 7 and it is just as true in many white-collar fields as well.
68
glance.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004); Steinberg, supra note 80, at 274 (noting how legal
academia operates its conferences like "an exclusive country club" rather than "developing
an inclusive community").
164 Jones, supra note 63, at 29 (emphasis added). She explains:
[T]he ABA Commission on Women in the Profession concluded that law firms
discriminate against women in a number of ways. For example, women have fewer
mentoring opportunities than do their male counterparts in the law firm setting
.... Additionally, women are less likely to be ,included in the social events that
build collegiality within the firm.
Id. at 27-28; see also id. at 19 (citing surveys of female lawyers at major firms that found
that "[m]entoring was not equally available to women" and "[b]usiness development, es-
sential to partnership, occurred mostly in male-oriented settings").
165 Daria Roithmayr, Barriers to Entry: A Market Lock-in Model of Discrimination, 86
VA. L. REV. 727, 775-80 (2000).
66 See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text (discussing efficiency wages).
167 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1835.
68 See, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, What Law Students Think They Know
About Elite Law Firms: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Third Year Law Students, 69 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1213, 1235-36, 1239 (2001). In elite law firms, "[o]ne must be trained, and in
order to receive training one needs a mentor." Id. at 1222.
Most associates ... are capable of working hard and producing work of high
quality. In order to demonstrate these qualities, however, one must gain access to
good work and training opportunities, both of which are in short supply ....
Linking up with a Senior Mentor ... [is a] way[ I in which an associate might try
to gain access to these vital but scarce developmental opportunities.
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Not only does this informality facilitate actual discrimination, it also
favors workers who happen to share natural ties and affinities with exist-
ing decisionmakers. Social contacts are invaluable in many fields as a
way "to form relationships with powerful incumbents"; 69 in fact, part of
the benefit of an education at an elite institution is developing crucial
professional contacts.7 0 Shared "cultural knowledge" is often important
for workers hoping to bond with, and be viewed as successful by, those
incumbents. '7
These cultural advantages are usually not considered discrimination
within the limited definitions of current antidiscrimination laws. An em-
ployer has not violated Title VII, for example, because an employee gained
informal knowledge and contacts by belonging to the same country club
as the employer's white male officers, or because the white male employee's
upbringing works to his advantage in interviews with (or workplace
schmoozing of) white male decisionmakers. However, the effect is much
the same as overt discrimination: the in-group worker gains very real ad-
vantages for reasons entirely divorced from the worker's merit as an em-
ployee. In short, subjective and informal decisionmaking leaves in place
the "old boys' network" of male decisionmakers selecting and grooming
male employees. This is an illustration of the prediction of social identity
theory:'72 whether consciously discriminating or not, empowered groups
will maintain their power by favoring their own members.
The problem is a circular one because the relevant contacts and cul-
tural knowledge come in large part from the workplace, but the lack of
those contacts and knowledge is a barrier to workplace entry and success.
If the entire workforce, including workplace decisionmakers, were evenly
Id. at 1235-36. Mentors are "in a position to give associates access to scarce training re-
sources and because they provide their proteges with political support within the partner-
ship as well as connections to important clients." Id. at 1239.
169 Adams, supra note 58, at 1152.
1
70 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 26.2, at 717-18 (noting that the Su-
preme Court in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), recognized that lack of contacts
was a problem for segregated schools).
171 See Roithmayr. supra note 165, at 782 (asserting that legal education favors "in-
cumbent whites [whol likely possess the equivalent of cultural 'know-how' to create the
culturally specific performance valued by the market"). More generally, one form of in-
group advantage is the "attraction- selection- attrition cycle":
First, people are differentially attracted to an organization based on the organiza-
tion's existing culture and personality .... Second, the organization's hiring pro-
cess will select individuals who are compatible with the organization's culture
and personality. Finally, individuals who are not compatible with the organiza-
tional culture, and have not been successfully socialized to that culture, will leave
eventually, ... [and] those who remain behind will constitute an even more ho-
mogeneous group ...
Id. at 772-73.
172 See supra notes 154-157 and accompanying text (discussing Adams's social psy-
chology theory of discrimination).
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divided between men and women, men would possess no advantage in
contacts or culture; even if contacts and culture split somewhat along
gendered lines, new female workers would have just as many ties to fe-
male decisionmakers as new male workers have with male decisionmak-
ers. 73 Because fewer decisionmakers are female, however, 7 4 new male
workers have contacts and cultural advantages that would not exist absent
current gender disparities.
IV. A DYNAMIC MODEL OF PREFERENCES FOR DIVERSITY:
INITIAL INTEGRATION FAILS To ELIMINATE SEGREGATION
This Part sets out a model of how women's preference for diversity
can lead to increased occupational segregation, even as more women en-
ter the labor force. Though nonquantitative, this model is deeply rooted
in economics; its premise is rational, strategic decisionmaking, and it
presents a dynamic analysis that considers how one change causes subse-
quent adjustments, and so on.'75 In labor economics, dynamic analyses can
yield surprising yet accurate predictions because they consider how changed
circumstances affect workers' expectations and thus affect whether or not
they enter a field or particular workplace.'76
The model in this Part assumes that the labor market entirely ex-
cludes women at first. Then, only certain fields, and certain specific firms,
"I I do not mean to imply that it would be an acceptable form of "equality" to have an
evenly split workforce in which men only mentored men and women only mentored
women. Such a state of affairs would be a troubling continuation of group-based favoritism
in an otherwise "equal" workforce.
174 This will almost always be the case for women of color, or people of color gener-
ally, even if they achieve proportional representation throughout the labor market. Although
women are more than half of the population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS SUM-
MARY FILE: AGE GROUPS AND SEX (2000) (women were 50.9% of the U.S. population in
2000), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?-bm = y&-geo-id =
01OOOUS&-qr-name=DEC_2000_SF IUQTPI &-dsname=DEC_2000_SF I_U&-
_lang=en&-redoLog=false&-_sse=on (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). people of color are less
than one-quarter of the population, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS SUMMARY FILE:
RACE ALONE OR IN COMBINATION (2000) (non-whites were 22.9% of the U.S. population
in 2000), available at http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/QTTable?-bm=y&-geo-id =
OIOOOUS&-qrname=DEC_2000_SF1 UQTP5&-dsname=DEC_2000_SFIU&-_Iang =
en&-redoLog=false&-_sse=on (last visited Feb. 1, 2004). Even if proportionally repre-
sented throughout the workforce, people of color would still constitute less than one-quarter
of the workforce decisiomakers. Thus, the work-force situation for women of color, or for
people of color generally, may be even more resistant to improvement than that for women
generally.
1
75 See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 3.1, at 36 ("[T]he economist's
distinction between static and dynamic analysis [is that] [s]tatic analysis suppresses the
time dimension of economic activity: All adjustments to change are assumed to occur in-
stantaneously .... Dynamic analysis, in which the assumption of instantaneous adjustment
to change is relaxed, is usually more complex .... ").
176 See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, app. 9A at 301-04 (setting out a
"cobweb model" of workers' choices among different fields, in which workers flock to
fields experiencing economic boom and avoid fields experiencing economic bust).
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start including women. The employers that begin including women will
find themselves with more female job applicants, beginning a dynamic
process yielding a counterintuitive result: even as more women enter the
workforce, making the overall workforce more integrated, occupational seg-
regation increases because the firms initially lagging in integration never
catch up, even if they do not discriminate.
A. Initial Conditions: Complete Segregation Followed by Uneven
Initial Integration
In this model, at first no women participated in any fields tradition-
ally considered "men's work." Then integration began, but not at the
same pace in all fields or firms. Initial integration focused only on certain
industries or certain job types for several reasons. First, some firms or
industries may be more welcoming of women because "[i]n a market of
many sellers the intensity of the prejudice ... will vary."'77 Second, some
jobs may conflict less with long-standing stereotypes of women's proper
role (e.g., the wide range of caregiving occupations that are more than
ninety-five percent female, in contrast to the physical labor occupations
that are more than ninety-five percent male). 78 Third, some firms may be
more sensitive to, or successful at, recruiting and including women be-
cause of, for example, overtly or subtly "gendered" job postings.'79 Fourth,
some firms may be earlier targets of lawsuits or public scrutiny of their
exclusionary practices. For example, many law firms faced sex discrimi-
nation suits in the 1980s, 8° but many major financial institutions did not
face similar suits until the late 1990s and early 2000s.1'' Fifth, some
male-dominated fields, more dependent on a steady influx of men in their
early twenties than others, experienced war-induced labor shortages of
" POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 26.1, at 716.
178 See Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
1"9Job postings may discourage women from applying simply by lacking gender-
neutral language. Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1811 & n.233 (citing a study
showing that the percent of women interested in the same job was either five percent,
twenty-five percent, or forty-five percent, depending on the gender-inclusiveness of ad
language). Even when postings have "apparently sex-neutral language," they can discour-
age female entry by communicating a desire for stereotypically male traits. Id. (citing C.
COCKBURN, MACHINERY OF DOMINANCE: WOMEN, MEN AND TECHNICAL KNOW-HOw 181
(1985)).
10 See, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting a law firm's
"freedom of association" argument that it was entitled to discriminate against women in
partnership decisions).
181 See, e.g., EEOC v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8421, 2002 U.S. Dist
LEXIS 11877 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2002) (gender discrimination pattern-and-practice case
filed in 2001); Mitchell v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 01 Civ. 2112, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4675 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2002) (gender discrimination class action filed in 2001); Martens
v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 3779, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22994 (S.D.N.Y. July 28,
1998) (approving the settlement of a gender discrimination class action filed in 1996);
Cremin v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, 957 E Supp. 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (gen-
der discrimination class action filed in 1996).
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men, leading them to bring women into the fold as a matter of economic
necessity.'82 Random chance probably also explains some uneven inte-
gration; even if all firms face the same stereotypes and incentives, one
firm or industry may still find itself with more female workers.'83
B. Widening of Initial Gender Gaps over Time
Once there is an initially uneven pace of integration, the gender gap
may widen due to various forces of labor supply and demand." Specifi-
cally, the level of gender diversity affects both female workers' incentives
to enter a workplace and employers' incentives to hire women.
1. Labor Supply: Women's Incentives To Enter a Workplace Increase
as the Representation of Women Increases
a. The Preference for Diversity: Variation in Intensity of Preference
Women prefer, all else being equal, to work for employers with more
female workers,'85 at least when workplaces range from male-dominated
to roughly balanced. 86 The model becomes a bit more complicated, but
182 See Kenneth W. Mack, A Social History of Everyday Practice: Sadie TM. Alexan-
der and the Incorporation of Black Women into the American Legal Profession, 1925-
1960, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1405, 1468 (2002) (stating that "[tihe exodus of men from the
civilian labor force during World War II opened up short-lived opportunities for more
women to attend law school and to secure employment in private practice as well as with
the government"); Constance Baker Motley, Remarks at the Thurgood Marshall Com-
memorative Luncheon, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 531, 539 (1996) (noting that "[d]uring World
War 11, when men were drafted into the service and college and graduate school facilities
began to lose their student populations, affirmative action programs arose in many such
institutions to increase the admission of blacks and women").
183 See, e.g., Roithmayr, supra note 165, at 787 (describing that "[iun a system that is
sensitive to initial conditions, even insignificant historical events, born of chance or some
minor fluctuation of a system, may have outcome-determinative effects").
184 See Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12, at 233-34.
The supply of labor reflects employees' willingness to work at different wage lev-
els; it slopes upward because employees will generally be willing to work more
(provide more worker-hours) if wages are higher .... The demand for labor
reflects employers' demand for worker-hours at different wage levels; it slopes
downward because employers will demand fewer worker-hours when wages are
higher.
Id. See generally EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 36-37 (discussing labor demand);
id. at 40-42 (discussing labor supply).
185 See supra Part III.B.2. In terms of formal economic modeling, the quantifiable ele-
ments of female workers' utility functions include not only money and hours but also the
percentage of women in the workplace.
1861 do not address women's preferences regarding female-dominated workplaces, such
as those jobs that are more than ninety-five percent female. See Jolls, Mandates, supra note
12 (identifying such jobs); infra note 197 (explaining why this Article focuses not on fe-
male-dominated workplaces but on workplaces that range from male-dominated to some-
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more realistic, if it allows for varied intensity of preferences, a widely
recognized element of labor supply models. For example, some workers
value high wages above all else, whereas others place more value on rea-
sonable hours.
Some women will have an unusually strong preference for a diverse
workplace-e.g., those who have already experienced discrimination, or
those who are most risk averse (such as women who are their families' pri-
mary wage earners). On the other end of the spectrum, some women.will
have little or no preference for diversity-e.g., those who have never ex-
perienced discrimination, those who are least risk-averse, or those who,
because they have no personal or professional ties to the community,
least fear having to switch jobs.
b. Widening of Small Initial Gender Gap Because of Sorting by
Intensity of Preference for Diversity
At the point of initial diversification, when firms first start hiring
women, female workers will tend to sort themselves by the strength of
their preference for diversity. Women with little or no preference for di-
versity may choose jobs without regard for diversity, while those with
stronger preferences for diversity will focus on the firms with somewhat
higher female representation.
At first, the gender gap is modest. Only those women with the strongest
preference for diversity-"Type I women"-will make job decisions based
on a very small initial gender gap, such as a 2% gap, where one field has
10% women and another has 12%. Whereas the Type I women will dis-
proportionately choose the 12% female workplace, most other women
will not notice or care about such a small difference and will make job
choices based on other criteria.
Because the Type I women disproportionately enter the slightly more
diverse workplace, the gender gap widens a bit-perhaps from a 2% to a
5% gap between workplaces. Because this gender gap is wider, it be-
comes noticeable and a subject of concern to somewhat more women-
specifically, women who are quite concerned about the diversity of their
workplace, though not so much as the Type I women. Call these the "Type II
women." Most women still may not care about this relatively small gen-
der gap; now, however, the gap is big enough to influence not only the
Type I women but also the Type II women. Accordingly, the Type I and
Type II women in the job market will disproportionately choose the more
diverse workplace.
The process continues: with the Type I and Type II women choosing
the field with 5% more women, the gap grows-perhaps to 10%, perhaps
larger. This larger gap will start to influence additional women who pre-
what majority-female).
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fer more diverse workplaces, though not as strongly as the Type I and
Type II women. This next group-"Type III women"-will start dispro-
portionately choosing the more diverse workplace, making it still more
diverse.
Thus, an initially modest gender gap widens due to positive feedback
resulting from a sorting process. Those with the strongest preference for
diversity flock to slightly more diverse firms. Because this widens the gen-
der gap, more women are drawn to the more diverse workplaces, making
them increasingly diverse in comparison to other firms. Formally, there is
positive feedback because an increase in X (the gender gap) leads to an
increase in Y (female interest in the more diverse workplace), and the
reverse is true as well: an increase in Y leads to an increase in X. Thus, an
initial increase in X (which was initially modest) leads to snowballing
increases in both X and Y-rapidly increasing diversity in the initially
slightly more diverse workplaces and growing gender gaps.
c. Widening Gender Gaps as a Form of "Female Flight":
The Reverse of "White Flight" Residential Segregation
This model of widening gender gaps-an initial gap widening due to
sorting by intensity of preference for diversity-is a logical reversal of
Professor Thomas Schelling's "tipping" model of the "white flight" that
yields residential racial segregation. As Adams has summarized:
Schelling's tipping model presumes that white residents have
varying levels of racial tolerance. Thus, when the first black
person enters a neighborhood, only the most intolerant whites
depart. Then, those vacancies are filled by more blacks, causing
those whites that are only marginally tolerant to leave. This
phenomenon repeats creating a tipping effect that drives more
and more whites out . . . . 87
The key point of the Schelling's "tipping" model, as Christina Ho has
explained, is that
start[ing] with the proposition that a population ... will exhibit
a wide range of preferences about racial makeup[,] ... Schel-
ling offers an account of how any binary population can manage
repeatedly to generate the same highly segregated residential
patterns .... [E]ven a small perturbation in composition, such
"I Adams, supra note 58, at 1119 n.177 (citing Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomov-
sky, The Integration Game, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1965, 1985-88 (2000)).
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as one caused by a desegregation order, can operate in Schel-
ling's model to produce "tipping" .... "'
Schelling's analysis is generalizable to gender segregation in the
workplace. 89 Both in Schelling's "white flight" model and in this "female
flight" model, the theory can be generalized to four elements. Where a
market features (1) an initially modest demographic "gap" (whatever the
cause) and (2) varied preferences for diversity, then (3) a dynamic posi-
tive feedback process of sorting by intensity of preference will occur,
resulting in (4) a widening demographic gap.
2. Labor Demand: Employers' Incentives To Hire Women Increase
as the Representation of Women Increases
As discussed above, a gender gap can widen in a dynamic process of
positive feedback on the supply side of the labor market. On the demand
side, a gender gap can increase for different reasons, but with the same
result: an initially small gender gap enlarges due to market pressures that
yield positive feedback.
a. Decreasing Sexism as a Workforce Includes More Women
An underrepresentation of women facilitates discrimination, hostile
work environments, and a general lack of equal opportunity by making
inaccurate stereotypes of (and bigotry against) women more likely and
hostile environments easier to effectuate, while allowing men to enjoy
network benefits based on the dominance of male decisionmakers.19
Whether arising from inaccurate negative stereotypes, pure bigotry, or a
desire to accommodate the biases of customers or employees, an aversion
to hiring women is, in labor-economic terms, a decreased employer de-
mand for female labor. 9' As a workplace becomes more diverse, these
aversions decrease, which means employers' demand for female labor
increases.
88 Christina Ho, Backfiring in Race Relations and Markets, 13 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
323, 334-35 (2002).
"I The model is "so abstract that any twofold distinction could constitute an interpre-
tation-whites and blacks, boys and girls, officers and enlisted men, students and faculty."
THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 138 (1978). Interestingly,
although a great many law review articles have applied and discussed Schelling's ideas,
none appears to have applied them to discrimination or segregation in the workplace.
1 See supra Part I1.B.2.b. The network benefits are partly a labor supply phenomenon
rather than a labor demand phenomenon, but they cut in the same direction.
'9' See EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 395-98; Jolls, Antidiscrimination, supra
note 29, at 685-86.
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b. Search Costs: Advantages in Outreach for Workplaces with
More Women
Labor demand is partly based on recruiting expense. An employer's
labor costs are lower, and labor demand therefore higher, when recruiting
is easier, cheaper, and more successful. Workplaces with more women
may find it easier to engage in the sort of efforts that firms often under-
take to recruit female candidates, such as having female employees make
campus visits, conduct interviews, and perform other recruiting work.
Men can recruit women, of course, but having female employees
participating in recruiting may make it more successful. Typical word-of-
mouth recruiting benefits those groups already represented in the work-
place, usually men, and signals a lack of openness to employees in un-
derrepresented groups, such as women and minorities. 92 Yet the reverse
also is possible: recruiting by women can signal to applicants that the
firm values female employees, especially when female employees par-
ticipate in recruiting events expressly designed for women or minorities.
Female employees may be more likely to know, through personal con-
nections, other female applicants or places to find female applicants. Just
as word-of-mouth recruiting perpetuates the status quo where the deci-
sionmakers are white men, women's involvement in recruiting can
change that status quo. Moreover, female employees may have an ad-
vantage in communicating with female applicants. They can speak with
more credibility about how women are treated at the firm, and they might
be better able to phrase advertisements, postings, and recruiting speeches
in ways that are more appealing to women, which can have a substantial
impact on whether women apply for jobs.' 93
A firm need not have a very high percentage of women to reap these
benefits, but a firm with a nontrivial representation of women will find it
easier to recruit women successfully than a firm with fewer women. Con-
sequently, firms with more women will have a higher demand for female
labor because they will find it easier to find and procure female workers.
c. Startup Costs of Integration
There are certain costs of integration, including: (1) inducing or
forcing incumbent male employees to allow women equal opportunity,
(2) adapting firm policies to address issues that have not arisen before
(e.g., the medical leave policy's coverage of pregnancy/maternity leave),
and (3) creating new policies necessitated by workforce diversity (e.g.,
harassment reporting and antidiscrimination training). Many of these
192 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
'13 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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costs are fixed costs,'94 varying little, if at all, with the number of em-
ployees or size of the employer. Once a firm begins to diversify, it is likely
to adopt an antiharassment policy and set up antidiscrimination training.
After it does, that cost does not increase as it further diversifies.'95 Once a
firm incurs these costs, however, it can employ the newly included work-
ers more cheaply than its competitors who have not yet borne the same
costs. A firm that has already hired many women and developed antihar-
assment, antidiscrimination, and pregnancy leave policies can hire more
women without again bearing the expense of transforming its workplace.
In contrast, a firm that has not yet diversified still faces these initial
fixed costs of integration. "Many companies are unwilling to incur the
short-term costs of developing effective human resource practices and
addressing cultural conflict .... Moreover, smaller companies often lack
the resources to invest adequately in improving their human resource
practices."'96 These are fixed costs that, before a firm pays them, are a
disincentive to hiring and creating a work environment palatable to the
workers in question. Thus, the cost of hiring women is lower, and labor
demand for women is higher, for firms that have already adapted their
workplaces as necessary.
V. THE QUANTITATIVE MODELS: WHEN WOMEN PREFER DIVERSITY AND
DIVERSIFICATION Is UNEVEN, GENDER GAPS REMAIN DESPITE
OVERALL DIVERSIFICATION
This Part sets forth more detailed quantitative models of how women's
rational preferences for diverse workplaces can lead to durable gender
segregation.
A. The Three Quantitative Models
This subpart sets out three quantitative models, each simulating the
labor market under different assumptions. Each model is based on a labor
market characterized by initial exclusion of women, slightly uneven ini-
tial integration, and a female preference for gender-diverse workplaces.
The first model assumes that all women prefer diversity. The second
model assumes that only some fraction of women have that preference.
The third model expands on the second model by incorporating the ef-
" See PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 69, § 7. , at 206 (defining fixed costs).
195 The disability context, which regularly features employers bearing one-time costs,
is the classic example in which costs do not impact the future employment level of the
accommodated group. See Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12, at 276 (noting that "[s]uch ac-
commodations entail a one-time cost, and thus an employer would not have any disincen-
tive, as a result of the accommodation mandate, to hire disabled workers once the one-time
cost had been incurred").
196 Sturm, supra note 108, at 543.
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fects of discrimination, especially in the more male-dominated work-
places.
In short, the models in this Part predict that labor market segregation
will arise, and persist, as a result of three simple conditions: (1) an initial
state of near-complete exclusion of women from most occupations (whether
due to social pressures, government regulation, or both), (2) early gender
integration that is uneven among different occupations and different
firms, some becoming slightly diverse before others (whether due to ran-
dom fluctuation or meaningful differences among occupations, firms, or
regions), and (3) forces of labor supply and demand making diversification
cheaper, easier, and more rewarding in the initially more diverse work-
places, as well as relatively costlier, harder, and less rewarding in the
initially less diverse workplaces. Given these conditions, a small gender
gap in the early days of integration will widen over time-even as more
women enter the labor market, and even without actual discrimination,
because women will disproportionately choose more gender-diverse
workplaces. Ultimately, the labor market will display a striking contrast
of progress and stagnation-increasing female labor force participation
and increasing occupational segregation. Discrimination, of course, will
widen the gender gap further.
Also strikingly, although the gender gap widens because of women's
preferences for more gender-balanced workplaces, it results in a degree
of segregation that is suboptimal from women's own perspective. Even as
women come to be almost half of the overall labor force, many work-
places will not be at all gender-balanced: some workplaces will become
majority-female, while others will remain male-dominated. Ironically,
women's rational preference for diversity yields less gender-balanced
workplaces than we might expect in a labor force that is fairly gender-
balanced in the aggregate. This lack of gender balance among work-
places, moreover, leaves the overall labor force slightly less than evenly
gender-balanced. Even if equal numbers of men and women want to
work, the persistence of segregation discourages some women from the
labor force.
1. The First Model: All Women Prefer Gender-Diverse Workplaces
This basic model examines a labor market in which all women have
the same preference for a diverse workplace, unlike the qualitative model
in the previous Part (in which women had a spectrum of preferences) and
unlike the models discussed later in this Part (which create more realism
by relaxing the assumption of identical preferences). I make eight as-
sumptions, the first two of which set out the basic theory.
Assumption #1: Women prefer diversity. All else being equal, women
prefer workplaces with more women, at least to the extent that workforces
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well below 50% women are less appealing than workforces that are closer to
50%. 197
Assumption #2: Initially slight and uneven integration. One firm or
sector hires a few women first-here, 10% for mathematical ease.'98
The third, fourth, and fifth assumptions rule out other causes of gen-
der disparities, such as discrimination and women being discouraged from
the labor force. These other causes surely exist in the real world, but this
model examines how much of the gender gap can be explained solely by
the theory at hand-that an initially small gender gap and women's pref-
erence for diversity will widen the gender gap even absent actual dis-
crimination.
Assumption #3: Men have no diversity preference. Men have no,
preference as to the presence of women in the workplace-i.e., male ap-
plicants do not seek workplaces that are predominately male or ones that
are gender-balanced.
Assumption #4: Nondiscriminatory hiring and attrition. Each
firm/sector hires in proportion to the population and suffers attrition in
proportion to its workforce-i.e., no discrimination causes any part of the
gender gap, and less diverse firms do not find it harder to retain female
employees.
Assumption #5: 50-50 split of job-seekers. Women and men apply
for jobs in equal numbers-i.e., at the point when they apply for jobs,
women are not discouraged from entering the labor force as a whole.
Importantly, we would see more of a gender gap, not less, to the ex-
tent that the third, fourth, and fifth assumptions are incorrect. Thus, making
these assumptions puts the theory of women's diversity preferences to the
Il These models do not address women's preferences between female-dominated
workplaces and gender-balanced workplaces (i.e., whether a 90% or 50% female work-
place is more appealing). The phenomenon of female-dominated workplaces is simply too
different from that of male-dominated workplaces for this Article's models to consider.
First, male-dominated workplaces are far more likely to reflect women's rational fear of
entry due to expectations of discrimination than female-dominated workplaces are to
reflect men's fear of entry due to expectations of discrimination. While men are likely to
fear the stigma that would accompany their entry into female fields, this presumably would
operate differently than fear of entry due to discrimination, perhaps because the stigma a
man faces could be mainly a phenomenon outside the workplace (e.g., among friends and
family). Second, traditionally male fields emerged because of the deliberate exclusion of
women, whereas traditionally female fields emerged because they were the only fields that
would accept women. Finally, male occupations have gradually diversified over time as
discrimination has decreased, Title VII has taken hold, and societal ideas of appropriate
gender roles have changed, whereas these same mechanisms do not equivalently operate to
diversify female occupations. Accordingly, the workplaces addressed in these models vary
from all-male to roughly one-third male, and the only preference discussed is women's
preference between workplaces that are more gender-balanced (i.e., closer to 50% women)
and less gender-balanced (i.e., both further from and well below 50% women).
"'The 10% figure is not necessary to the findings; any nonzero percent yields a
qualitatively similar result. This difference in initial diversification between firms/sectors
may be due to a number of different factors, as discussed supra Part IV.A.
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test: can it explain gender gaps if the other likely causes of such gaps are
excluded?
The sixth, seventh, and eighth assumptions are basically model specifi-
cations that should not meaningfully affect the ultimate conclusions of the
analysis.
Assumption #6: Two relevant firms/sectors, denoted "Alpha" and
"Beta," each with (for ease of math) 100 workers. Critically, the analysis
is identical regardless of its scale. Alpha and Beta may be two different
sectors of the economy, such as heavy industry and retail sales; two oc-
cupations, such as teaching and law; two individual companies, such as
two particular law firms; or two departments in the same employer, such
as a firm's sales division and its human resources division.
Assumption #7: Workers apply for only one job. Applicants choose
which of the two employers-Alpha or Beta-to which to apply. This is
not as unrealistic as it first sounds. In a broader model, with many em-
ployers, this assumption would be merely that applicants cannot apply to
all employers/sectors simultaneously but instead must focus their efforts
on one sector, one job type, or a limited number of employers.
Assumption #8: 100 employees, 10% attrition each year. At both Al-
pha and Beta, hiring recurs each year to replace the ten departing em-
ployees.
a. The Initial State of the Labor Market and Breakdown of
Job Applicants
With few women in the labor market, Alpha has a workforce of 10%
women (assumption #2), while Beta has no women. This is the relevant
initial state.
TABLE 1.1: INITIAL STATE OF LABOR MARKET (FIRST MODEL)
Workplace or sector % women % men
in workforce in workforce
Alpha 10% (10 of 100) 90% (90 of 100)
Beta 0% (0 of 100) 100% (100 of 100)
Each year, X men and X women apply for jobs in the labor market in
which the only workplaces are Alpha and Beta, since under assumption
#5 men and women enter and participate in the labor force in equal num-
bers. Because the men are indifferent to the level of gender diversity in
their workforce (assumption #3), they apply in equal numbers to Alpha
and Beta, each of which receives X/2 male applicants. Women, however,
prefer the more gender-diverse employer (assumption #1)-here, Alpha.
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Thus, women apply only to Alpha, which receives X female applicants;
Beta, because it is the less diverse employer, receives no female appli-
cants. The result of these conditions is that while Beta hires from a pool
of only male applicants, Alpha hires from a mixed, but disproportionately
female, pool of applicants.
TABLE 1.2: ANNUAL JOB APPLICATIONS To ALPHA AND BETA
(FIRST MODEL)
Job applications each # applying to # applying to
year Alpha Beta
Of the X men X/2 X/2
Of the X women X 0
Total (men & women) X women, X/2 men 0 women, X/2 men
Per 10 slots 6.7 women, 0 women,
3.3 men 10 men
Because both Alpha and Beta engage in nondiscriminatory hiring (as-
sumption #4), each hires in proportion to its applicant pool. The last row,
above, illustrates this: Alpha's applicant pool is two-thirds women, so for
every 10 slots, it can be expected to hire 6.7 women and 3.3 men.' 99
Beta's applicant pool is all male, so it hires 0 women and 10 men.
b. The Evolution of Diversity at Alpha and Beta
Each year, 10 employees leave Alpha and 10 leave Beta (assumption
#8). Because the model assumes nondiscriminatory attrition (assumption
#4), employees depart in proportion to their population in each workforce.
So in the first year, when Alpha is 10% female, 10% of the departing
employees are women-i.e., of the 10 departing, I is female and 9 are
male. At Beta, where all employees are male, all 10 departures are men.
The new employees change the female population at Alpha. Of Al-
pha's 10 new employees, 6.7 are women, so in the first year, Alpha loses
I woman (from attrition) but gains 6.7 (from hiring). Beta loses no
women and gains no women. At the end of the first year, then, Alpha has
a net gain of 5.7 women while Beta has no net gain.
'9 When the model speaks of hiring 6.7 women, it means that is the "expected" num-
ber of women hired. That is, a 70% chance of hiring 7 women, with a 30% chance of hir-
ing 6, yields an expected value of 6.7 hired.
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TABLE 1.3: FEMALE POPULATION RESULTING FROM ATTRITION AND
REPLACEMENT-YEARS 1-2 (FIRST MODEL)
Year Alpha Beta
Initially 10.0 0.0
1 st year change +5.7 0.0
[-1, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 1st year 15.7 0.0
2nd year change +5.1 0.0
[-1.6, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 2nd year 20.8 0
The second year, Alpha's population change is slightly smaller. The
new arrivals still include 6.7 women, but because Alpha is now more di-
verse, it loses 1.6 women to attrition rather than 1.0. At the end of the
year, Alpha's net gain is 5.1 women; Beta still has no women.
This pattern recurs each year: Alpha's female population still in-
creases, but at a decreasing rate, because as the female population in-
creases, Alpha loses more women to attrition. While it takes only 3 years
for women to become one-quarter of the workforce, it takes 11 years for
women to become one-half of the workforce.
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TABLE 1.4: FEMALE POPULATION RESULTING FROM ATTRITION AND
REPLACEMENT OVER TIME (FIRST MODEL)
Year Alpha Beta
Initially 10.0 0.0
1st year change +5.7 0.0
[-1, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 1st year 15.7 0.0
2nd year change +5.1 0.0
[-1.6, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 2nd year 20.8 0.0
3rd year change +4.6 0.0
[-2.1, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 3rd year 25.4 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
4th year change +4.2 0.0
[-2.5, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 4th year 29.6 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
5th year change +3.7 0.0
[-3.0, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 5th year 33.3 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
6th year change +3.4 0.0
[-3.3, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 6th year 36.7 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
7th year change +3.0 0.0
[-3.7, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 7th year 39.7 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
8th year change +2.7 0.0
[-4.0, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
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End of 8th year 42.5 0.0[-0.0, +0.0]
9th year change +2.4 0.0
[-4.3, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 9th year 44.9 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
10th year change +2.2 0.0
[-4.5, +6.7] [-0.0, +0.0]
End of 10th year 47.1 0.0
[-0.0, +0.0]
Equilibrium 67.0 0.0
Gradually, Alpha's workforce reaches an equilibrium gender mix (67%
women) identical to its applicant pool. It takes many years of increas-
ingly slow diversification for a diverse applicant pool to turn a male-
dominated workforce into a gender-balanced workforce. The graph below
illustrates how the diversification of Alpha is initially rapid but tapers off
over time and reaches a limit (equilibrium).
FIGURE 1
ALL WOMEN PREFER DIVERSITY (FIRST MODEL):
EVOLUTION OF DIVERSITY AT ALPHA
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Beta, with no female applicants, does not diversify at all. Representing
a firm initially lacking diversity, Beta remains male-dominated even as
the labor market diversifies.
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2. The Second Model: Only Some Women Prefer Diverse Workplaces
The second model modifies assumption #1 of the first model to rec-
ognize that women's diversity preferences are heterogeneous: only some
women consider diversity in their job choices.2" Assumptions #2 through #8
remain unchanged.
21
Revised Assumption #1: Some women prefer diversity, others are in-
different. Half of women prefer workplaces with more women, meaning
firms with up to 50% women.
2 2
a. The Initial State of the Labor Market and Breakdown of
Job Applicants
The initial state of the labor market is the same as in the first model.
At first there are no women (or almost none); then Alpha comes to have a
workforce of 10% women (assumption #2), and Beta, not undergoing this
change, remains at 0 women.
TABLE 2.1: INITIAL STATE OF LABOR MARKET (SECOND MODEL)
Workplace or sector % women % men
in workforce in workforce
Alpha 10% (10 of 100) 90% (90 of 100)
Beta 0% (0 of 100) 100% (100 of 100)
Again, each year, X men and X women apply for jobs (under as-
sumption #5). Because the men are indifferent to the level of gender di-
versity in their workforce (assumption #3), they apply in equal numbers
to Alpha and Beta-each receives X/2 male applicants.
This model differs from the first model as to where women apply to
work. Half of the women (X12) prefer the more gender-diverse employer
(assumption #1), Alpha, so these women apply only to Alpha. Half of the
women are, like the men, unconcerned with diversity, so they apply in
equal numbers to Alpha (X14) and Beta (X/4). As a result, Alpha gets
many more female applicants (X12 + X/4), but Beta gets some female
applicants (X14) as well.
200 See supra Part IV.B. 1.a.
201 See supra Part V.A. 1.
202 This model assumes women are indifferent as to whether there are more than 50%
women. See supra note 197.
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TABLE 2.2: ANNUAL JOB APPLICATIONS TO ALPHA AND BETA
(SECOND MODEL)
Job applications each year # applying to # applying to
Alpha Beta
Of the X men X/2 X/2
Of the X/2 women X/2 0
concerned with diversity
Of the X/2 women X/4 X14
unconcerned with diversity
Total (men & women) 3X/4 women, X/4 women,
X/2 men X/2 men
Per 10 slots 6 women, 3.3 women,
4 men 6.7 men
As in the first model, Alpha and Beta engage in nondiscriminatory
hiring (assumption #4), so each hires in proportion to its applicant pool
(the last row above in Table 2.2). Alpha's applicant pool is 3/5 women, so
per 10 slots, it can be expected to hire 6 women and 4 men. Beta's appli-
cant pool is one-third women, so its expected hiring is 3.3 women and
6.7 men.
b. The Evolution of Diversity at Alpha and Beta
As in the first model, Alpha and Beta each lose 10 employees each
year (assumption #8). Under the assumption of nondiscriminatory attri-
tion (assumption #4), employees depart proportionally. In the first year,
when Alpha is 10% female, 1 of the 10 departing employees are female.
At Beta, where all employees are male, all 10 departures are men.
This model differs from the first model in that Alpha has somewhat
fewer female applicants, and Beta has some female applicants. New hir-
ing changes the female population at both workplaces, not just at Alpha
(as in the first model). Of Alpha's 10 new hires, 6 are women, so in the
first year, Alpha loses I woman from attrition but gains 6 from hiring. Beta
loses no women and gains 3.3. In the first year, Alpha's net gain is 5
women, and Beta's net gain is 3.3.
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TABLE 2.3: FEMALE POPULATION RESULTING FROM ATTRITION AND
REPLACEMENT-YEAR I (SECOND MODEL)
Year Alpha Beta
Initially 10.0 0.0
1st year change +5.0 +3.3
[-1.0, +6] [-0.0, +3.3]
End of 1st year 15.0 3.3
The evolution of diversity at Alpha is similar to that in the first model,
except that Alpha here has a less female-dominated applicant pool, so its
diversification rate is slower, and in equilibrium it has fewer women. The
evolution of diversity at Beta proceeds as at Alpha, but with many fewer
female applicants, so Beta has less diversification, and its equilibrium
remains male-dominated.
TABLE 2.4: FEMALE POPULATION RESULTING FROM ATTRITION AND
REPLACEMENT-OVER TIME (SECOND MODEL)
Year Alpha Beta
Initially 10.0 0.0
1st year change +5.7 +3.3
[-1, +6] [-0, +3.3]
End of 1st year 15.0 3.3
2nd year change +4.5 +3.0
[-1.5, +6] [-0.3, +3.3]
End of 2nd year 19.5 6.3
3rd year change +4.0 +2.7
[-2.0, +6] [-0.6, +3.3]
End of 3rd year 23.5 8.9
4th year change +3.6 +2.4
[-2.4, +6] [-0.9, +3.3]
End of 4th year 27.1 11.3
5th year change +3.3 +2.2
[-2.7, +6] [-1.1, +3.3]
[Vol. 27
Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces
End of 5th year 30.4 13.5
6th year change +2.9 1.9
[-3.1, +6] [-1.4, +3.3]
End of 6th year 33.3 15.4
7th year change +2.7 + 1.7
[-3.3, +6] [-1.6, +3.3]
End of 7th year 36.0 17.1
8th year change +2.4 + 1.6
[-3.6, +6] [-1.7, +3.3]
End of 8th year 38.4 18.7
+2.1 +1.4
9th yearchange [-3.9, +6] [-1.9, +3.3]
End of 9th year 40.5 20.1
10th year change +1.9 +1.3
[-4.1, +6] [-2.0, +3.3]
End of 10th year 42.4 21.4
Equilibrium 60.0 33.3
Alpha's and Beta's workforces gradually reach equilibrium levels of
60.0% and 33.3% women, respectively-the percentages in their appli-
cant pools. 2 3 As in the first model, it takes many years of slow, deceler-
ating diversification for a diverse applicant pool to change a nondiverse
workforce. Diversification in this model is greater but still incomplete.
The graph below shows how both Alpha and Beta initially see rapid di-
versification that then tapers off and gradually reaches a limit (equilib-
rium) that is much higher for Alpha than Beta.
203 The results are similar, just different in magnitude, if more or fewer than half of
women prefer diversity: if p represents the fraction of women who do have a preference for
diversity, X is (identically) the number of men in the applicant pool and the number of
women in the applicant pool, and EA is the equilibrium fraction of Alpha's workforce that
is female, then:
EA = ( pX + (1 - p)X/2 )/(pX + (1 - p)X/2 + X/2) = (p + 1 )/(p + 2)
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FIGURE 2
SOME WOMEN PREFER DIVERSITY (SECOND MODEL):
EVOLUTION OF DIVERSITY AT ALPHA & BETA
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3. The Third Model: Effects of Employers'Discrimination and
Difficulty Integrating Workplaces
To examine the isolated effects of an initial gender gap and a prefer-
ence by women for diverse workplaces, the two preceding models assumed
no discrimination. The most rapid diversification occurred early on, be-
fore attrition started to remove incumbent female employees. This last
aspect of the models does not comport with the reality that male-dominated
firms and sectors find it difficult to make the initial leap to include a non-
trivial number of women.
The third model modifies the second model by considering the ef-
fects on diversification of discrimination, as well as search and startup
costs faced by employers first hiring women. To the extent that discrimi-
nation does exist (i.e., that assumption #4, "nondiscriminatory hiring and
attrition," does not hold), there would be a greater gender gap than the
first and second models predict. Discrimination and search and startup
costs decrease women's rate of hiring and increase women's rate of attri-
tion (relative to the rates for men), thus inhibiting progress toward diversifi-
cation. Consequently, compared to the above models finding slow and
incomplete diversification, initial diversification in the third model is even
slower, and the gender gap is even wider.
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a. Difficulties of Initially Including Women: Search and
Startup Costs
In the first and second models, diversification is fastest early, before
attrition slows it down. In reality, as the third model notes, search and
startup costs slow the initial pace of diversification.2" They are significant
mainly when a firm is first incorporating women, and they most inhibit
the initial efforts at diversification-especially at Beta, which starts out
with no women at all. Search and startup costs therefore delay, for the
early years of diversification, the success of efforts to increase the work-
place representation of women. These costs eventually diminish, as less
diverse firms and sectors eventually increase their female populations, but it
takes longer than in the second model to achieve even a modest female
population.
b. Discrimination in Hiring and Attrition
Diversification is slower than predicted by the second model when
discrimination against women exists. Discrimination may occur in hiring
decisions, deterred applications when women feel discouraged from ap-
plying, or other workplace actions (such as hostile work environments,
unequal promotion opportunities, and worse assignments). The latter forms
of discrimination yield greater female attrition as women rationally de-
part and avoid unwelcoming workplaces. In the second model, the rate of
diversification was the net of the rate of hiring of women minus the rate
of attrition of woman. If women are hired at a lower rate than men, and/or
female attrition is greater than male attrition, then the rate of diversification
will be slower than the second model predicts.
c. Modeling the Nonlinear Relationship Between Rate of
Diversification and Effects of Discrimination Plus Search and
Startup Costs
As discussed earlier, there is good reason to expect that discrimina-
tion is greater when the workplace is less diverse and much greater when
it is truly male-dominated. The diversification-inhibiting effects of discrimi-
nation are inversely proportional to the female population in a firm or sector,
and the relationship is nonlinear. It can be modeled with two variables: W
(female percentage of workers) and a coefficient r (a fraction between 0 and
I representing the magnitude of discrimination's inhibition of diversifica-
tion). The graph is modeled as a hyperbola, a shape that creates a nonlin-
21 See supra Part IV.B.2.b-c (defining relevant search and startup costs as difficulties
male-dominated firms have in recruiting potential female applicants and adjusting work-
place policies and behaviors).
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ear relationship between W and its effects. The effect of discrimination is
high at first (when W is low); then it rapidly diminishes; then it continues to
diminish, but more slowly. The formula for the hyperbola is:
f(r, W) = I -r/( I + W/IO)
Table 3.1 shows the effect if r = 0.6 (i.e., if discrimination inhibits initial
diversification by 60% and incrementally less as the female population
increases).
TABLE 3. 1: EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION AND SEARCH/STARTUP COSTS:
AMOUNT OF INHIBITION OF DIVERSIFICATION
If r = 0.6 (i.e., discrimination inhibits initial rate of diversification by
60%)2
05
W Inhibiting effect of discrimination: 1 - r/( I + W1O)
0 0.40 (i.e., the diversification rate is only 40% of the rate that
would exist without discrimination and search/startup costs)




205 For different levels of r, there is a similar "curve" showing how much discrimina-
tion inhibits diversification at various levels of female representation (W). The effect varies
in magnitude, but the basic relationship between W and the inhibiting effect of discrimina-
tion is the same hyperbola based on the function above, f (r , W) = I - r / ( I + W110 ).
For example, if r = 0.5, the inhibiting of diversification is similar to when r = 0.6, just
slightly lesser in magnitude:
If r = 0.5 (i.e., 50% inhibition of initial rate of diversification)
W Inhibiting effect of discrimination: / - r/( I + WI 0)
0 0.50 (i.e., the diversification rate is only 50% of the rate that would
exist without discrimination and search/startup costs)
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50 0.90 (90%)
60 0.91 (91%)
Graphically, the relationship is a hyperbola crossing the vertical axis
(i.e., where W = 0) at 1 - r and increasing rapidly, then slowly, until W
increases enough to lessen the effects of discrimination.
FIGURE 3
DIVERSIFICATION-INHIBITING EFFECT OF DISCRIMINATION
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d. Evolution of Diversity at Alpha and Beta: Slower Diversification,
Especially at Early Stages of Integration
The third model modifies the second model by considering that dis-
crimination and search and startup costs depress female labor force partici-
pation, especially when women are most underrepresented in the work-
place. Because diversification is severely inhibited in the early days of
integration and somewhat less inhibited later, diversification is much less
rapid initially. Eventually, as more women enter the workforce, the effects of
discrimination and search and startup costs diminish. In this light, di-
versification efforts face a circular problem: effective diversification re-
quires the entrance of women, but a lack of women prevents them from
entering.
The diversification curve in the third model (Figure 4) is less steep
than in the second (Figure 2), especially when diversification is just
starting. It eventually steepens, but much later than in the second model.
The details depend on the magnitude of the diversity-inhibiting effects of
discrimination (coefficient r), but the difference may be dramatic. For
example, in the second model, Alpha achieves a 40% female workforce
after 9 years. In this third model (with r = 0.5), because diversification is
slower, especially at first, Alpha reaches 40% only after 15 years.
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Discrimination and search and startup costs make diversification not
only slower, but also less complete. Alpha's equilibrium in the second
model was 60% female. Here, while discrimination diminishes after some
diversification occurs, its residual effects leave the labor force with fewer
women. When r = 0.5 or 0.6, for example, the equilibrium representation
of women at Alpha is about half (50.5% and 48.3%, respectively), and
the equilibrium at Beta is less than a quarter (24.0% and 21.7%, respec-
tively). Below is the graph of both workforces where r - 0.5.206
FIGURE 4
SOME WOMEN PREFER DIVERSITY; DISCRIMINATION
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B. Implications of the Models
The above models have a number of implications for labor markets
and female workers. These implications are the same in all models, dif-
fering only in the magnitude of resulting segregation. The models demon-
strate that given an initially small gender gap, plus a preference among some
women for a diverse workplace, we can expect to see the labor market
evolve as follows, even absent discrimination in the particular workplaces
being studied. The first three implications focus on what these models mean
for employers (i.e., for the labor market as a whole or for individual firms/
sectors), and the last two focus on what these models mean for women.
Implication #1: Majority-female workforce at the initially slightly
diverse firms/sectors; continued male domination of other firms/sectors.
Once Alpha started out as slightly more diverse than Beta (the initial 10%
206 Again, with a different r, the ultimate outcome would be similar, just slightly dif-
ferent in the ultimate pace and extent of integration. If r = 0.6, for example (i.e., if dis-
crimination inhibits the initial rates of diversification by 60%), diversification would be
even slower and even less complete than in this graph showing the pace and extent of inte-
gration when r = 0.5.
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gender gap), women overwhelmed Alpha's applicant pool, making most
of that pool female and leaving most or all of Beta's applicant pool male.
Thus, even absent discriminatory hiring practices, Alpha will continue to
hire more women than men, and Beta will continue to hire primarily or
only men.
Implication #2: Decelerating diversification of the more diverse firms!
sectors. The more diverse a workplace gets, the more its attrition includes
women. 207 Consequently, the net rate of increase of the percentage of women
there declines over time, and "even if nondiscrimination in personnel
actions were to be scrupulously followed, [nondiscrimination] still would
not be an expeditious way to overcome the adverse effects of past dis-
crimination."2"8 Thus, even if the rate of diversification looks impres-
sively rapid at first, it eventually slows considerably. This is a somewhat
counterintuitive outcome given the widespread belief that the toughest
part of diversification is the initial work of beginning to include the excluded
group.
Implication #3: Deeper applicant pools in the more diverse firms!
sectors. While Alpha's applicant pool includes both women and men, Beta's
includes primarily men. This is the "discrimination penalty" Beta faces.
In a broader model, Beta might, for example, have to pay a compen-sating
wage differential to induce women to apply for jobs. However, as discussed
below, such efforts have questionable efficacy and might be legally sus-
pect.
209
Implication #4: Suboptimally uneven diversity from women's per-
spective. In the models, women prefer a balanced workforce (or at least
identically prefer 50% or 67% women over none). But their choice is only
between a female-dominated workplace (Alpha) or a male-dominated work-
place (Beta). Women on average would be better off (i.e., closer to their
goals of always working in diverse environments) if they applied in equal
numbers to both diverse (Alpha) and nondiverse (Beta) workplaces.
However, the collectively rational outcome-uniform diversity across the
labor market-does not occur, because it is rational for each individual
woman to apply to the more diverse workplace (Alpha). Schelling has noted,
in an analogous discussion of college students' social decisions, how in-
dividuals who prefer diversity may subvert that preference by avoiding
the less diverse option, paradoxically leaving the level of diversity subopti-
mally uneven precisely as a result of their decisions to pursue diversity.
210
Implication #5: Fewer women in the labor market overall. In the
second model, the eventual equilibrium result was 93 women (combining
Alpha and Beta) and 107 men (since Alpha and Beta employed a total of
207 See, e.g., EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 1, at 413-14 & tbl. 12.7 (noting the
phenomenon and providing a simple numerical example).
208 Id. at 413.
201 See infra Part V.D.
210 SCHELLING, supra note 189, at 37-38.
20041
Harvard Women's Law Journal [Vol. 27
200 workers). There was a 50-50 split of job-seekers, so what happened
to the other 7 women?2"' They most likely became part of the unemploy-
ment rate, or they entered the ranks of the "discouraged unemployed" who
stop seeking jobs after not finding the kind of work they sought. Not all
women can get jobs in the preferable more diverse workplace/sector (Al-
pha), and jobs in the less diverse workplace/sector (Beta) are less ap-
pealing to women than to men. Some women-the ones who value diver-
sity relatively highly and thus apply to Alpha but are not offered a job-
would choose to leave the labor force rather than work at Beta.
C. Beginning an Empirical Examination: Comparison to the Actual
Labor Market
The predictions of the above models do seem consistent with the re-
cent evolution of the American labor market. In the four decades since
Congress passed Title VII and the Equal Pay Act,21 the first wide-scale
efforts at gender equity and diversification, there has been a peculiarly
uneven and incomplete degree of diversification of the labor market.
From the era of industrialization in the nineteenth century l3 to the mid-
twentieth century, subject to rare exceptions, women and minorities were
excluded from all but a few generally undesirable occupations that were
held mainly by women and minorities.2"4 In the early to mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the workforce began to diversify by gender and race, spurred partly
by social change and partly by war-induced shortages of (white) male
labor.21 5 Whatever the cause, diversification was inconsistent across occu-
pations and even subfields of the same occupation:2"6 even as the overall
workforce integrated, integration in historically male subfields was slow.
217
21 The shortfall is worse in the third model, which considers discrimination. The size
of the drop-off depends on the magnitude of discrimination.
22 Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
213 I choose this starting point as essentially the beginning of the modern labor market
in which work outside the home began to constitute most of the (paid) labor performed.
See WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 20-24.
21
4 Id.
215 See Motley, supra note 182. at 539.
216 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 63, at 4-5 (discussing the lack of women in the legal
profession until relatively recently).
Women made their way into the legal profession substantially after they began
entering other professions in significant numbers. While women comprised a
significant percentage of teachers and social workers, and were beginning to enter
the medical and scientific fields in more than token numbers, in 1920 only slightly
more than one percent of the country's lawyers were women.
Id. at 4 (citing VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW 12 (1998)); see also supra Part
IV.A (suggesting why some fields and firms experienced initial integration while others
remained segregated).
217 See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 108, at 492-98 (discussing task forces formed at De-
loitte & Touche to improve the firm's retention and promotion of female employees). One
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The recent American labor market has seen continued increases in female
labor force participation but highly durable occupational segregation."'
One difference between the actual labor market and the labor market
theorized by this Article is that the latter predicts that occupational seg-
regation will widen before stabilizing. In reality, occupational segrega-
tion declined before stabilizing at a still substantial level. The difference
may be that Title VII, whatever its flaws, has been a powerful tool for
attacking truly overt discriminatory exclusion.
When Title VII was passed, the labor market was replete with what
Sturm has termed "first generation discrimination": "Workplace segrega-
tion was maintained through overt exclusion, segregation of job opportu-
nity, and conscious stereotyping. Dominant individuals and groups delib-
erately excluded or subordinated women."2"9 Title VII was well-suited to
attack first generation discrimination, as reflected by the decline in occu-
pational segregation during the 1960s and 1970s. Occupational segrega-
tion began to level off, however, in the 1980s and stabilized almost com-
pletely in the 1990s.22 This stabilization may reflect that, as Sturm has
theorized, society's remaining gender problems are "second generation
discrimination"-the more subtle forms of bias and disadvantage that act
as headwinds preventing full equality and that Title VII has difficulty
targeting effectively.22" '
Thus, Title VII can explain the initial decline in occupational segre-
gation not predicted by this Article's models. The leveling off of occupa-
task force found that "women's assignments tended to be clustered in not-for-profit com-
panies, health care, and retail .... Women were rarely assigned to such high-potential
areas as mergers and acquisitions." Id. at 496 (alteration in original) (quoting Jane Roess-
ner, Deloitte & Touche (B): Changing the Workplace, Harvard Business School Case Study
No. N9-300-013, at 5 (Sept. 28. 1999)). This phenomenon can also be seen in the legal
profession:
Recent empirical evidence suggests there is occupational segregation in the legal
profession .... Women tend to be over-represented in certain areas[,] ... more
likely to work in government and public interest jobs[,] ... more likely to spe-
cialize in fields that are comparatively less lucrative, such as family law[, and] ...
unlikely to work in bankruptcy, securities, and criminal cases involving narcotics
and organized crime. [Women] will not succeed in the legal academy to the same
extent as [their] male colleagues.
Jones, supra note 63, at 15-17; see also Pamela Edwards, Teaching Legal Writing as Women's
Work: Life on the Fringes of the Academy, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 75 (1997) ("The
position with the second highest percentage of women professionals (67%) employed in
law schools is in the Lecturer/Instructor category"); Constance Baker Motley, My Personal
Debt to Thurgood Marshall, 101 YALE L.J. 19, 23 (1991) (noting that the United States
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York did not decide that women were as
capable as men at handling federal criminal prosecutions until 1970, when the first woman
was hired in the criminal division).
2'18 See supra Part I.
219 Sturm, supra note 108, at 465-66.
220 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
221 See Sturm, supra note 108, at 468-78.
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tional segregation, as Title VII stopped being as powerful a tool against
contemporary second generation discrimination, shows that absent an anti-
discrimination enforcement regime capable of redressing this type of dis-
crimination, labor markets will remain segregated even as they include
more and more women, exactly as predicted by this Article's models.
Future empirical work could provide confirming or disconfirming evidence
of whether this Article's theory accurately characterizes labor markets at a
micro level. Some questions to ask include: Within an industry, has inte-
gration been incomplete and uneven among firms? Has the rate of inte-
gration been higher at those firms that began to diversify sooner?
D. Possible Responses of the "Beta" Firms with an Underrepresentation
of Women: Compensating Wage Differentials
A full analysis of possible responses of the "Beta" firms to correct
their underrepresentation of women is beyond the scope of this Article. Such
responses are important: technically, one cannot conclude that a market is
reaching an inefficient result without examining all possible responses to
such inefficiency. One of the premises of this Article, however, is that
firms in recent years have become less able to signal to female workers that
they treat women fairly. This subpart discusses the efficacy and legality
of certain measures that the "Beta" firms can and do take to redress their
shortages of female labor.
1. Wage Differentials for All Employees
Beta might respond to a shortage of female applicants by raising wages
or benefits to expand its entire applicant pool, male and female. However,
Beta still would draw more male than female applicants, since on aver-
age, for the same wage, men will find a Beta job more appealing than
women will. Many women who prefer diverse workforces, but are drawn
to Beta by higher wages, will be less happy with the job than their male
coworkers. The lack of appeal to women means not only fewer female
applicants, but also higher female attrition.
More generally, an employer that needs job applicants but possesses
an undesirable workplace can procure applicants in two ways. It can hire
those who least mind the undesirable workplace condition,222 but this will
not cure the shortage of applicants. Alternatively, it can offer a "compen-
sating wage differentia"-a higher wage that would make it worthwhile
for some workers to suffer the workplace condition. Yet its applicant pool
still will be populated by the workers least bothered by the workplace con-
222 This assumes workers vary in their distaste for undesirable workplace conditions-
a realistic assumption because people vary in their degree of general risk aversion and toler-
ance of specific risks and conditions (e.g., verbal abuse, cigarette smoke, long work hours).
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dition, since these workers require the lowest compensation to endure the
unpleasant condition. To the extent women find a lack diversity undesir-
able, more men will apply to Beta whatever the wage offered, leaving Beta
with a disproportionately male applicant pool.
2. Wage Differentials for Female Employees Only: Benefits and
Affirmative Action as Compensating Wage Differentials
Beta might decide that its problem is not just a shortage of appli-
cants but a lack of female interest in its jobs. Based on this realization, it
could offer a compensating wage differential only to female employees.
While it is illegal to pay women more than men for the same work, there
are more subtle ways Beta can accomplish the goal of spending more money
on female employees. Some firms offer paid maternity or parental leave
and childcare support 2 3 -expenditures that female employees (on aver-
age) take advantage of more often than male employees do. Such benefits
function as a higher wage for female workers.
In this light, certain female-friendly measures are a form of affirmative
action, which itself serves as a compensating wage differential. Beta could
offer women a higher chance of promotion than men, essentially offering
women higher projected future wages. Somewhat analogously, Pompian
has argued that affirmative action is a means of counteracting expecta-
tions of discrimination. 224 The comparable observation here is that, even
if no "discrimination" is known to be present, affirmative action can help
women recognize a greater prospect for high future compensation in a
job that is otherwise unappealing because it is in a male-dominated work-
place. Employers can reach this result using various forms of affirmative
action: actual hiring or promotion preferences for women, benefits used
mainly or exclusively by women (e.g., childcare or maternity leave), or
scholarships for women. Recent judicial restrictions on affirmative ac-
tion 225 may limit the ability of firms to provide female workers this sort of
compensating wage differential. Nevertheless, as discussed later, this Ar-
ticle's analyses show that such affirmative action remains normatively
appealing.
2 26
223 See, e.g., NALP DIRECTORY, supra note 8 (citing law firms' maternity and parental
leave policies); id. at 1284 (noting that Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP offers attor-
neys "back-up child care"); id. at 1285 (noting that Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP provides
"emergency child care").
224 Pompian, supra note 48, at 554-57.
225 See supra notes 112-114 and accompanying text.
226 See infra Part VI.B.3.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW:
NORMATIVE PRESCRIPTIONS
This Part discusses ways in which we should expand and refocus anti-
discrimination law and policy to remedy the problem of persistent occu-
pational gender segregation. The observation of durable gender segrega-
tion could support competing normative arguments: the "conservative"
argument against imposing burdens and duties on employers whose work-
places remain male-dominated, and the "liberal" argument that employ-
ers whose workplaces remain male-dominated should be subject to a
broad regime of civil liability and affirmative action duties. In that de-
bate, this Article decidedly advocates the "liberal" side. Because the du-
rability of segregation and the preferences that reinforce segregation are
results of society's history of discrimination and exclusion, we should
undertake aggressive antisegregation efforts such as changes to the focus
and burdens of proof in Title VII cases, affirmative action, and educational
reform. Such measures, however, must be carefully targeted to avoid the
creation of counterproductive incentives that could worsen rather than
improve the situation.
A. Legal and Policy Implications: Fodder for Both Sides?
This Article demonstrates that occupational gender gaps are quite per-
sistent, even absent current discriminatiorr, but especially when discrimi-
nation is present. The solution this Article advocates is that employers with
workplaces that remain male-dominated should be subject to a broad re-
gime of civil liability and affirmative action duties. Yet this Article's
conclusions could also support an argument against imposing such bur-
dens and duties on these employers. As discussed below, however, much
of that argument is based on a far too restrictive view of both women's
choices and society's responsibilities to correct its failures.
1. The Conservative Argument for Employers: "It's Not Our Fault"
In response to this Article's models, an employer with few women
might argue (to put it bluntly), "See, it's not our fault." In other words,
current business owners and workplace decisionmakers are not responsi-
ble for their current gender gaps, which resulted from decades-old, ini-
tially small gender gaps. Whether these gaps originated from random chance
or discrimination, they have widened due to women's own choices. Ac-
cording to this line of argument, current workplace gaps, even large ones,
are not clear evidence of discrimination because (as demonstrated by the
first and second models) even firms that do not discriminate may find them-
selves lacking female applicants and thus forced to hire mainly men. As a
matter of employment law doctrine, the conclusion that durable, substan-
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tial gender gaps may not reflect intentional discrimination can support
two conservative arguments against discrimination liability: (1) statistical
evidence is insufficient to prove discrimination, and (2) gender gaps re-
sult from women's choices rather than from discrimination.
a. Argument 1: Statistical Evidence of Gender Disparity Does Not
Demonstrate Discrimination
This Article's analysis could support an argument against the long-
established rule that a statistical showing of a workplace gender disparity
can prove discrimination. In class actions, "relevant statistical compari-
sons alone may establish a prima facie case of discriminatory practices.
27
Such statistics usually must compare the defendant's workforce to the actual
applicant pool, but if applicant data is unavailable or unreliable, then
plaintiffs can, in appropriate cases, simply compare the defendant's work-
force to that of the local labor force. 218 In individual discrimination cases,
in contrast, where statistics "may be helpful, though ordinarily not dis-
positive," evidence of a gender disparity "need not be so finely tuned.
29
The statistics must show only the numbers of men and women in a de-
fendant's work force without any consideration of the applicant pool or
the other workers' qualifications.
230
227 Deloach v. Delchamps, Inc., 897 F.2d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 1990); see also Bruno v.
W. B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 767 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting that in class actions, "where
liability depends on a challenge to systemic employment practices[,] courts have required
finely tuned statistical evidence," including a "requirement that statistical evidence account
for minimum qualifications" (alteration in orginal)).
22
8 See, e.g., United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1093-94 (6th Cir. 1998)
(noting that "certain employment practices obscure labor-market statistics, alternative
statistical analysis suffices to establish a prima facie disparate impact .... Likewise,
"[where] 'labor market statistics will be difficult if not impossible to ascertain[,] ... meas-
ures indicating the racial composition of "otherwise-qualified applicants" for at-issue jobs
are equally probative,' and ' where "figures for the general population might ... accurately
reflect the pool of qualified job applicants,"' ... plaintiffs may ' rest their prima facie cases
on such statistics ....' (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-
51 (1989) (citing N.Y. City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 585 (1979))).
.22 Bruno, 882 F.2d at 767 (citing Krodel v. Young, 748 E2d 701, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
230 See, for example, Luciano v. Olsten Corp., in which the court admitted simple sta-
tistics-charts and graphs showing gender breakdown and average salaries for various job
titles-in an individual sex discrimination case because "'[i]t is well-settled that an indi-
vidual disparate treatment plaintiff may use statistical evidence regarding an employer's
general practices . . . .' [T]he data offered was not of a scientific nature but merely reflected
existing conditions at the Company at the time of Luciano's termination." 110 F.3d 210,
217 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 84, 89 (2d Cir.
1990)). See also Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439 (9th Cir. 1995), which reversed a
grant of summary judgment to a defendant in an individual national origin discrimination
case. Id. at 443-44. Plaintiff had presented "statistical evidence suggesting possible bias in
the fire department." Id. at 444. The statistics lacked data on applicants and were merely
"that only two men of color work in the entire Carlsbad fire department, and that they oc-
cupy the lowest ranking positions[,] and ... of the twenty five fire fighters who have served as
fire captain .... only one was a member of a minority group." Id. at 443. See also Pierce v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co., 65 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 1995), an individual age
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This Article's analysis, however, shows that gender disparities can per-
sist even absent current discrimination. Thus, an argument can be made
that the existing doctrine exaggerates the probative value of statistics show-
ing workplace disparities. Disparities may reflect only discrimination that
occurred long ago-before any applicable limitations period 23 t-and a sub-
sequent decision by women not to enter that workplace, despite a lack of
any unlawful discrimination in the recent past.
b. Argument 2: Gender Gaps Result Not from Discrimination but
from Women's Lack of Interest in Predominantly Male Jobs
This Article's analysis could support a broad application of the "lack
of interest" doctrine, as typified by the previously discussed EEOC v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.23 2 In that case, the court accepted the argument that
women's own choices, not gender-biased hiring practices, were the cause
of the gender disparity in commission sales positions.233 Agreeing with
Sears's defense, the court held that women chose not to pursue the posi-
tion because its nature was not appealing to them. Similarly, in this Arti-
cle's models, women decline to work in certain occupations because they
prefer diverse workplaces and are disinclined to join a predominantly
male workplace. Furthermore, employers can do little to solve this prob-
lem: if an employer has a mostly male workforce, it will have difficultly
signaling to women that it is a fair, nondiscriminatory employer.
234
c. The Rejoinder to Argument 2: A Disincentive Rather than a True
or Innate Lack of Interest
The modified "lack of interest" explanation presented in argument 2
is troubling because it badly misreads the cause of women's disinclination to
join male-dominated workforces. Literally, of course, the problem of women
choosing not to enter male-dominated fields does reflect a lack of interest
discrimination case in which the court admitted a document showing that the defendant
hired seven younger employees after terminating the plaintiff. The defendant argued that
"without statistics regarding the relevant applicant pool or qualifications of those employ-
ees, the list was not probative while being very prejudicial." Id. at 573. The court found
that the document "demonstrates... that Santa Fe hired younger people to fill the position
.... Id.
231 The statute of limitations for a Title VII gender discrimination claim is 180 days or,
if a state or local antidiscrimination agency exists and meets certain prerequisites, 300
days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2004). Some state and local laws have a three-year stat-
ute of limitations. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2) (McKinney 2004) (three-year limita-
tions period for discrimination claims); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d) (2001) (three-year
limitations period for discrimination claims).
232628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. 11. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). See supra
Part lll.B.2.b.i.
2 Sears, 628 F. Supp. at 1302-03.
234 See supra Part II.. 1.c.
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in the jobs, but it does not represent an innate preference as portrayed by
courts crediting employers' "lack of interest" defenses. 235 As Katherine
Baker has noted, because "women have been deprived of access[,] ...
their preferences ... are not likely to reflect what their preferences could
be in a world in which they had more power .... [T]hey are making
choices that they would not make in a world with different norms and
laws.' 236 As Williams has colorfully articulated, "[c]hoice is only a de-
fense against discrimination if women's marginalization is freely chosen
in the same sense that some people choose Mars Bars over Baby Ruths.
'2 37
Schultz has collected evidence that workplace gender segregation is
not a simple result of innate preferences, childhood socialization, or family
considerations. In her study of women's work experiences and choices,
Schultz showed that although "people and jobs are gendered[,] ... they
are not naturally or inevitably so." '238 Rebutting the idea that women in-
herently lack interest in traditionally male fields, Schultz has noted that
"family-related characteristics" such as marriage or children "do not pre-
dict women's likelihood of being employed in a male-dominated or fe-
male-dominated occupation at any given time." '239 She also cites evidence
that women do not inevitably seek "jobs sex-typed as 'female' . . . [over]
jobs sex-typed as 'male"' but instead "change the sex-type of their occu-
pations over time."24 This shows that women "acquire[ ] definite work
preferences and a stable work role identity only after 'a number of on-
the-job experiences and trial and error experiments.""'24 Schultz does not
deny the influence of gendered socialization of children, but she con-
cludes that "early socialization is a necessary but insufficient condition to
account for sex segregation at work." '242
Williams similarly rejects the argument that women and men have
inherently different job preferences. She argues that much of the current
gender inequity results from the work/family conflict faced by mothers
who, even when they work, remain saddled with disproportionate home-
235 See supra Part Il.B.2.b.i.
236 Katherine K. Baker, Gender, Genes and Choice: A Comparative Look at Feminism,
Evolution, and Economics, 80 N.C. L. REV. 465, 510, 518 (2002). Feminist legal scholar-
ship has recognized the law's role in creating, perpetuating, and reifying gender norms and
even the notion of biological sex. See, e.g., Tracy Higgins, By Reason of Their Sex: Femi-
nist Theory, Postmodernism, and Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536, 1550-54; JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 2 (1990). The
law often takes as given what it has in fact had a hand in creating.
231 WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 15.
238 Schultz, Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1815.
239 Id. at 1819-20. Cf Selmi, supra note 93, at 729 (noting that "disparities in house-
work persist even in dual-earner couples, as working women still perform approximately
twice as much housework as their spouses" and arguing that "it seems clear that marriage
and children negatively affect women's wages and career paths").
24o Schultz. Telling Stories, supra note 29, at 1817-18.
241 Id. at 1822 (quoting MARY WALSHOK, BLUE-COLLAR WOMEN: PIONEERS ON THE
MALE FRONTIER 115-16 (1981)).
242 Id. at 1824 (emphasis added).
2004]
Harvard Women's Law Journal
making and childcare duties.243 But she notes that women's domestic role
is neither innate nor inevitable. What many see as the natural domestic role
of women was not deemed "women's work" until the past century.2" In
the 1700s and much of the 1800s, women were considered markedly in-
ferior, but they were not pigeonholed into "domesticity" in the modern
sense. "[C]hild care was not seen as a task requiring full-time attention,"
and women assisted their husbands by doing "work traditionally done by
men," including serving as "blacksmiths, wrights, printers, tinsmiths,
beer makers, tavern keepers, shoemakers, shipwrights, barbers, grocers,
butchers, and shopkeepers." '245 After the shift to an industrial economy
took men out of the home for long work days, society adopted the mod-
ern "descriptions of the 'true natures' of men and women," with women
supporting their husbands' absences by doing all the domestic work.
2 46
In sum, those who advance the "lack of interest" argument improperly
essentialize, or view as innate, the preferences that many women currently
express; they ignore the fact that gendered characteristics change as cul-
tural practices change.247 We can recognize women's preferences while si-
multaneously working to change the conditions that give rise to them and
holding accountable the employers that fail to take aggressive efforts to
remedy those conditions.
2. A Better Interpretation: Fighting Prejudice Is Not Enough
This Article argues for a different, more liberal, interpretation of the
models set forth here: we must do more than merely fight bigotry if our
goal is genuine equal opportunity in the labor market. If gender gaps that
inefficiently and unfairly inhibit women's choices can persist. and even
widen without intentional discrimination, then we must broaden our fo-
cus beyond formally illegal discrimination. Aggressive use of antidiscrimi-
nation laws, while important, simply will not redress the gender gaps we
continue to see.
Tangibly harmful consequences result from workplace gender gaps.
Because women who behave entirely rationally are deterred from enter-
ing male-dominated workplaces, those workplaces remain male-dominated
and unwelcoming to the few women who do enter. Thus, the overall labor
force remains disproportionately male. This causes women to lose out on
equal workplace opportunities and denies employers the benefit of a
more complete labor pool. Gender gaps also have the inefficient effect of
skewing women's choices. Women who are best-suited (by talent, inter-
243 See generally WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3.
244 Id. at 20-24.
24
1 Id. at 21.
246 Id. at 23.
247 See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 141, at 34, 42; WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra
note 3, at 20-24.
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est, etc.) for work that is male-dominated are incentivized, by the gender
gap, to choose predominantly female lines of work, which have the added
disadvantage of likely being lower-paying.
Although we have made some progress against the problem of the ex-
clusion of women from the workforce, "[i]t is a mistake to think that time
alone will result in gender parity. '248 The notion "that we have solved the
problem with gender inequity" is dangerous: "In some sense, the American
women's movement is a victim of its own success. Its accomplishments
have undercut the urgency of further struggle.
2 49
Moreover, the premise that the law should only enforce bans against
intentional discrimination is based on the flawed "perpetrator perspec-
tive" of current antidiscrimination laws, which views discrimination as
occuring in rare, discrete instances rather than as a background condition
of society.25 ° By focusing on individual rather than societal discrimination
and requiring fault and causation as prerequisites to recovery, this view
of discrimination tends to ignore the damaging effects of pervasive, struc-
tural discrimination, 25' for which employers should also be held account-
able, at least as a matter of morality or social policy if not as a matter of
civil liability, when they fail to take active measures to redress it.
In sum, gender gaps constitute a serious, complex problem that basic
antidiscrimination doctrine will not adequately remedy. The need there-
fore arises for broader tools to combat both workplace disparities and the
lack of fully equal opportunities.
B. Normative Suggestions
1. Generally: More Intervention into Labor Markets
A major implication of this Article's analysis is that more governmental
and/or judicial intervention is both justified and necessary to correct a
deeply imperfect labor market. Free-market dogma dictates that we should
generally defer to market outcomes as presumptively efficient because they
are the result of freely made decisions among all market participants.
252
248 Jones, supra note 63, at 46.
249 Id. at 47 (quoting DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER
INEQUALITY 14 (1997)).
250 See Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the
Defendant is Not an Intentional Perpetrator: The Problems of Unconscious Disparate
Treatment and Unjustified Disparate Impacts, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 225, 231-
32 (2003) (citing Alan Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimi-
nation Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1976)).
251 See id. at 231-33; Charles R. Lawrence 1II, Book Review: "Justice" or "'Just Us":
Racism and the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831, 845-46 (1983) ("The perpetrator
perspective first drastically narrows the legal concept of discrimination and then, despite
the continuing presence of the conditions formerly associated with discrimination, pro-
claims the disease cured, or at least almost cured.").
252 See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U.
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The state of today's labor markets, however, is not the efficient product of
freely made employer-employee decisions. Rather, it is the product of
several market inefficiencies: (1) an inefficient initial state of gender ex-
clusion, (2) discrimination that maintained some degree of that initial
exclusion, and (3) female workers' rational decisions to disfavor male-domi-
nated workplaces because they lack complete and accurate information
about which workplaces discriminate.
A full normative analysis of tools to redress gender gaps is beyond
this Article's scope. The following is a brief discussion of proposals that
are supported by this Article's conclusions.
2. Broader Civil Liability: Coverage of "Unintentional"
Discrimination and a Shift in Focus of Discrimination Law
Toughening antidiscrimination laws could not only lessen discrimi-
nation but also slow female attrition. Both of these effects would acceler-
ate the diversification rate, over time lessening the gender gap between the
labor market's inclusive Alphas and male-dominated Betas. 53
a. Strengthening Liability for "Unintentional" Discrimination
This Article's analysis demonstrates that gender gaps cannot neces-
sarily be eliminated by lessening intentional discrimination. Women tend
to choose against male-dominated workplaces both because they suspect
that discrimination might be the cause of the disparity and because, re-
gardless of the cause of the disparity, there are many problems endemic
to male-dominated workplaces, such as male-dominated culture and subjec-
tive decisionmaking that favors men.
Discrimination law can do better to target these endemic problems
reflecting the not-quite-intentional ways male-dominated workplaces dis-
courage female entry. The outer frontiers of antidiscrimination law cover
a range of practices that do not reflect pure discriminatory animus but nev-
ertheless disadvantage women. These "accommodation mandates" (in Jolls's
terminology) include family/medical leave (which covers childbirth and
certain childcare responsibilities)254 and disparate impact liability (for vari-
ous "neutral" workplace conditions and policies with a disproportionately
L. REV. 975, 987 (2002) ("[B]ecause private markets are presumptively efficient, govern-
ment intervention is justified only in cases of market failure."); Yoshiro Miwa, Corporate
Social Responsibility: Dangerous and Harmful, Though Maybe Not Irrelevant, 84 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1227, 1253 (1999) ("[A]dvocates of the corporate social responsibility posi-
tion have too little confidence in the free market and excessive confidence in the compe-
tence of the government. We must question the value of governmental intervention in the
market much more critically and thoroughly .... ").
253 Compare supra Part V.A.2 with Part V.A.3 (modeling labor markets without and
with discrimination, respectively).
211 See Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12, at 226.
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negative impact on women). 255 Traditionally, courts and scholars have
deemed the above doctrines more intrusive and troubling than the core pro-
hibition on intentional discrimination. In that view, banning intentional
discrimination simply forces employers not to make irrational decisions,
while other forms of liability force employers to bear additional costs in
the name of fairness.
256
As Jolls notes, however, "there is no sharp line between antidiscrimina-
tion and accommodation" 25 7 because even traditional discrimination li-
ability forces employers to bear real costs.258 And as I have noted previ-
ously, "[w]ith discriminatory tastes, even bigoted discrimination looks
rational" as an accommodation of nonmonetary worker or employer pref-
erences. 259 Given the lack of real difference between traditional antidis-
crimination and "accommodation mandates," the law can enforce the latter
just as aggressively as the core ban against discrimination.
b. A Changed Focus for Antiharassment Law
This Article has discussed the subtle ways that male-dominated work-
places act to exclude women, resulting in highly durable gender gaps. This
analysis supports Schultz's proposal for a broad conceptual reform of anti-
harassment law:
The focus of harassment law should not be on sexuality as such.
The focus should be on conduct that consigns people to gendered
work roles that do not further their own aspirations .... [H]arass-
ment is not driven by a need for sexual domination but by a de-
sire to preserve favored lines of work as masculine .... In this
new account, hostile work environment harassment is closely
linked to job segregation by sex.26
Antidiscrimination efforts should expand beyond the core ban on in-
tentional discrimination because that limited focus is not enough to re-
dress durable gender gaps. If civil liability is to counteract the disincen-
255 See Jolls, Antidiscrimination, supra note 29, at 652-66 (under disparate impact
doctrine, "an employer ... is required to incur special costs in response to the distinctive
needs of a particular group of workers," even though "the employer lacks any intention to
treat a particular group of employees differently").
256 See id. at 667-68 (citing critics of "accommodation mandates" who view such laws
as being "profound[ly] apart" from the basic law against intentional discrimination).
2157 Id. at 698.
258 Id. at 685-87 (stating that "prohibitions on discrimination based upon customer or
coworker attitudes or upon correct employer beliefs about a particular group impose financial
costs on employers, . . . forc[ing] employers to employ certain individuals even though
they impose" added costs).
259 Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 202, 234 (noting that, in the economic sense of the
term, "all discrimination is 'rational' given the legitimacy of non-monetary utilities").
260 Schultz, Harassment, supra note 43, at 1689-91.
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tives to female labor force participation, it must focus on exclusionary
harassment and other structural problems that deter women from entering
male-dominated workplaces.
c. A Better Balance for Antidiscrimination Law: Attacking the
Incentive To Avoid Lawsuits by Not Hiring Women or Minorities
The problem with strengthening laws against hostile work environ-
ments, promotion bias, and other discrimination is that an increased threat
of lawsuits may discourage employers from hiring women. Because there
are very few Title VII lawsuits alleging discriminatory failure to hire
(compared to termination, promotion, or harassment),26" ' employers may
refuse to hire women to avoid the threat of lawsuit.262 This problem is "an
example of the theory of the second-best":
[W]ell-intentioned tinkering with a quirky, imperfect market can
worsen matters ... because efforts to correct only one market
flaw can exacerbate other flaws. In employment law, imposing
liability on an important but imperfectly provided good (em-
ployment of [a group]) can make the good provided "safer"
(freer from discrimination) but decrease the quantity provided
(increase the employer incentive to discriminate [in hiring]) ....
[G]aps in a tight rule induce leakage through those gaps. When
lawsuits are weaker at attacking refusals to hire than at attack-
ing job terminations, the effect is a far cheaper expected penalty
for refusal to hire.
263
This is a difficult problem without a ready solution. Remedies beyond law-
suits, such as affirmative action and public subsidy programs for work-
place accommodations and diversity reforms,26 are one type of response.
261 See Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 84, at 1027 (finding that six times as many
Title VII lawsuits allege discriminatory discharge as allege discriminatory failure to hire).
262 See, e.g., Jolls, Antidiscrimination, supra note 29, at 691 (discussing costs to em-
ployers of lawsuits from minority or female workers); Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12, at
255-56 (noting that because accommodation mandates increase employer costs, employ-
ment levels of women and minorities may decrease); Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 218
(noting that certain causes of action exist almost exclusively for those actually hired, such
as harassment, FMLA leave, and disability accommodation, which contributes to the de-
gree to which there are more suits by employees than by rejected applicants).
263 Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 218-19 (citing Stephen F. Williams, Second-Best:
The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L. REV. 932, 934-36 (1993);
John J. Donahue 11, Employment Discrimination in Perspective: Three Concepts of
Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2583, 2588 n.19 (1994)).
264 See, e.g., Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 219-24 (proposing public subsidies for
workplace accommodations, in part based on this problem); Charny & Gulati, supra note
34, at 94 (proposing "cash incentives" for firms that demonstrate progress toward a fair
promotion process).
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However, there are also several litigation-based possible solutions.
First, policymakers could make the current Title VII regime more com-
prehensive-i.e., fix the "uneven regulatory intensity" of Title V1 265 by in-
creasing damages for discrimination in hiring, thereby increasing the in-
centive to bring such lawsuits.266 Courts could do this without policy re-
forms by presumptively doubling or trebling the damages (e.g., as puni-
tive damages, or by generously approximating actual damages) in failure-
to-hire cases.
267
Second, apart from facilitating failure-to-hire lawsuits, courts could
make it dangerous from a liability standpoint for employers to have low
representations of women. Courts could impose a lesser burden of proof
on harassment or failure-to-promote plaintiffs in workplaces with very low
representations of women. Such a shift in burdens would recognize that
male-dominated workplaces are likely to have such problems as a work en-
vironment hostile to women and biased promotion procedures. The Supreme
Court has used its knowledge of what "experience has proved"-essen-
tially, applying common sense or taking judicial notice-in calibrating the
burdens of proof in discrimination cases. 268 It could do so again.
Third, after a finding of discrimination of any kind-hiring, promotion,
or otherwise-if the defendant has few women in its workplace, courts
could impose intrusive relief to induce greater hiring of women, even if the
plaintiff had not claimed hiring discrimination. Any form of gender bias
can decrease female workforce representation, so increasing the number
of women employees is a proper remedy for a finding of any kind of gen-
der discrimination, especially since a greater presence of women will
likely reduce the problems associated with male-dominated workplaces.
Courts could impose changes in employment practices, such as reforming
subjective recruiting methods with discriminatory effects 69 and requiring
tough, meaningful antidiscrimination policies and procedures.
The main thrust here is that antidiscrimination law should be strength-
ened, with two shifts in focus: (1) addressing the sort of discriminatory
265 Ho, supra note 188, at 325 (citing Donohue & Siegelman, supra note 84, at 1016
fig. 6).266 See Jolls, Mandates, supra note 12, at 281-82 (discussing this possibility but not
acknowledging that "enhancing the penalties for hiring differentials would impose various
sorts of administrative and other costs").
267 Posner suggests double or treble damages "in cases in which the damages are
small." POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 24, § 26.4, at 723.
268 Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575, 579-80 (1978) (describing the
basic Title VII prima facie showing for the plaintiff-(1) belonging to a racial minority,
(2) applying and being qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants,
(3) being rejected despite his qualifications, and (4) after his rejection, the position remaining
open and the employer continuing to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifica-
tions-as "proof of actions taken by the employer from which we infer discriminatory animus
because experience has proved that in the absence of any other explanation it is more
likely than not that those actions were bottomed on impermissible considerations") (em-
phasis added) (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973))).
2
69 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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conditions that inhibit women from entering, or thriving in, male-dominated
workplaces (e.g., exclusionary harassment and discriminatory conditions
of employment); and (2) to redress the perverse incentive employers have
to minimize lawsuit exposure by avoiding hiring women, increasing the
penalties for hiring insufficient numbers of women.
3. The Need To Move Beyond Civil Liability: Affirmative Action and
Other Diversification Policies
A full normative argument for affirmative action is beyond the scope
of this Article. Still, this Article's central thesis-that banning discrimi-
nation is not enough to overcome a legacy of discriminatory exclusion and
that true equality requires further steps-supports affirmative action.27 °
a. The Lack of a "Sharp Line" Between Antidiscrimination and
Affirmative Action
In arguing that affirmative action is a necessary remedy for past dis-
crimination as well as for present exclusion and segregation, this Article
further supports the analytic point that there is "no sharp line between anti-
discrimination and affirmative action." '271 Jolls has reached this conclu-
sion based on an economic analysis showing that both "forms of inter-
vention require employers to bear undeniable financial costs associated
with a particular group of employees, and in that sense to 'accommodate'
these employees.' 272 Employing a sociological analysis, Adams has made
much the same point about "how hard it is to tell the difference between
affirmative action and nondiscrimination," '273 such as when affirmative action
takes the form of minority outreach aimed at "reduc[ing] the discrimina-
tory impact of word-of-mouth recruitment practices that had functioned as a
barrier to entry" for excluded groups. 274 Such an approach is about re-
forming a "status quo [that] maintained a system where minorities and
women were being deprived of an opportunity to compete. '275 Reform of this
sort could be viewed as either antidiscrimination, in that it eliminates
discriminatory effects of current employment practices, or affirmative action,




210 For further arguments supporting affirmative action, see, for example, Adams, su-
pra note 58; Ho, supra note 188, at 336-39.
271 Jolls, Antidiscrimination, supra note 29, at 698.
272 Id.
273 Adams, supra note 58, at 1134.
211 Id. at 1135.
2
75 Id. at 1134.
276 Id.
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traditional entrants into segregated fields pave the way for others;28 2 yet
without such public campaigns, word of this progress is limited to anec-
dotes.
Virginia's nursing campaign targets men declining to enter an occu-
pation typed "female," but such campaigns easily can do the reverse by tar-
geting women not entering male fields. It may be tougher to attract women
to male fields than vice-versa, however, because women's disincentive
based on discrimination is likely greater than men's disincentive to avoid
social stigma and stereotypes. 283 Yet by showing women in traditionally
male occupations, public campaigns could decrease women's perception
that a woman becoming, for example, a police officer would be a truly aber-
rational thing. Just as importantly, these campaigns also could reduce
male perceptions that women rarely enter these fields, possibly decreasing
the likelihood that men will harass as perceived interlopers on male "turf'
those women who do enter.284 Given that people regularly misestimate prob-
abilities,285 it is possible that men and women alike overestimate the rar-
ity of a woman entering a traditionally male field. This problem could be
partially redressed by public campaigns, an almost unassailable form of
"affirmative action."
4. Educational Efforts: A Different Dialogue About Discrimination
and Exclusion
This Article's findings support a shift in the way we think about, dis-
cuss, and teach the subjects of discrimination and exclusion. Implicitly,
we teach (in schools as well as in scholarly writings) about gender and
race relations with a misleading focus on bad actors and exceptional he-
roes. Traditionally, the main problem is cast as one of specific "bad ideas"
and "bad actors," mostly in the past: evil racist sheriffs, laughably back-
ward sexist laws, and epic battles-invariably successful-to defeat these
bad actors and their bad ideas. The story of the excluded groups tradi-
tionally is a story of heroes-exceptional women and minorities who
achieved great things without the advantages held by white men, opened
doors as pioneers for their group, or led major battles to defeat oppression.286
282 See Martha Minow, The Constitution and the Subgroup Question, 71 IND. L.J. 1, 22
(1995) (arguing that "reduction of racial prejudice is most affected by significant contact
with members of other groups").
283 However, the reverse may be true because, with "male" work typically more highly
paid than "female" work, "male" work generally is more desirable to women than "female"
work is to men.
284 See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii (noting that men are more likely to harass women who enter
what men perceive to be male occupational territory).
285 See Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 207-08.
286 See, e.g., MINoW, supra note 141, at 114, 129 (noting that many states already re-
quire educational coverage of "political and economic contributions of women" and of
prejudice against minorities).
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b. Public Campaigns: A Less Controversial yet Important Form of
"Affirmative Action"
Some programs that could be characterized as affirmative action, such
as public campaigns aimed at encouraging an excluded group to enter an
occupation, are important but relatively uncontroversial. Such programs
are affirmative action in the sense of being expenditures of resources solely
for the benefit of one group. However, because they do not involve di-
rectly choosing one applicant over another, it is hard to see a legal challenge
to them; indeed, it is hard to see who would even have standing to bring a
lawsuit.
For example, many states, including Virginia, often suffer from a short-
age of nurses.277 Nursing is a traditionally female field, and the models in
this Article show how labor shortages result when one gender essentially
opts out of an occupation.2"8 Virginia could increase nurses' wages, but,
as discussed above, such an ill-targeted compensating wage differential7 9
would pay higher wages mostly to women in the hopes that a few more
men would enter the field.
One solution, chosen by the Virginia Partnership for Nursing, is a pub-
lic campaign to attract men to nursing and promote the field to students who
have not yet fully adopted social preconceptions about nursing. The Part-
nership hired a private firm to research why people (especially men) do not
enter nursing and then to produce a public campaign to promote the field. In
the campaign targeting adult men, images of stereotypically "manly" men
appear above the question "Man Enough to Be a Nurse?"28 0 Less gender-
focused materials target high school students ("there's really a career lad-
der ... and the money is good") and grade school students ("nurse force"
superheroes, male and female, showing nursing as exciting).
28 '
It is easy to mock this imagery or view it as a troubling appeal to
stereotypes. However, Virginia's campaign is an important counter to a
deeply ingrained stereotype-that men should not become nurses. Non-
27 "[T]he Virginia Study of Nursing and the U.S. Health Resources and Services Ad-
ministration's estimate of the shortage ... puts Virginia's nursing workforce at 15% below
demand by 2005. A public crisis could be created with Virginia at 39th in the nation for
nurse to patient populations." Press Release, Virginia Partnership For Nursing,
Nurseschangelives.com Aims to Stop State's Nursing Shortage (Nov. 7, 2002), available at
http://www.virginiapartnershipfornursing.org/press.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
278 See supra Part V.B.
271 See supra Part V.D. 1.
280 See, e.g., Virginia Partnership for Nursing, Men in Nursing Poster (2003), available
at http://www.virginiapartnershipfomursing.org/men-poster.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
The Oregon Center for Nursing now uses a similar poster. Oregon Center for Nursing, Men
in Nursing Poster (2002) (showing male nurses in a variety of stereotypically male roles,
including a Harley rider, a U.S. Navy Seal, a black belt in martial arts, a rugby player, and
a snowboarder), available at http://www.oregoncenterfornursing.org/aboutocnnews/rn-
poster2002.htm (last visited Feb. I, 2004).
281 Virginia Partnership for Nursing, Our Campaigns (2003), available at http://www.
virginiapartnershipfornursing.org/campaigns.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2004).
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The laudable intention behind this kind of storytelling is to show
that discrimination is a discredited idea of the past and that discrimi-
nated-against groups have had great accomplishments and victories. How-
ever, these stories promote the flawed "perpetrator perspective ' 287 and
teach, inadvertently or not, that: (1) discrimination is about problems in
the past and a limited number of bad people in the present, and (2) women
and minorities can and should overcome even the most fearsome obsta-
cles without help.
Although well-intentioned, the basic "evildoers and heroes" tales ne-
glect to tell the more enduring story. Exclusion remains, even absent any
nefarious mastermind, and masses of women and minorities go about their
lives facing a barrage of obstacles to their career efforts. To avoid per-
petuating simplistic myths, we should reform our teachings about the
challenges that women and minorities face.
First, using terms such as "exclusion" rather than "bigotry" would
shift the discussion from one of specific bad actors to one of a social prob-
lem without a clear villain. Second, we should teach that remedying ex-
clusion requires changing the hearts and minds of all, not just fighting the
bigots.288 Third, our accounts of excluded groups should focus more on
day-to-day struggles of average group members than on heroes. We
should stress not only that women and minorities have overcome many
obstacles, but also that obstacles still exist and have a substantial impact
on the lives of many.
289
VII. THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL LABOR ECONOMICS To ACCOUNT FOR
WOMEN'S PREFERENCES FOR DIVERSE WORKPLACES-
AND A COMPARISON TO NONECONOMIC ANALYSES
This Article's models have important implications not only for anti-
discrimination law and policy but also, on a more theoretical level, for eco-
nomic analysis of law. Especially in recent years, economics has evolved
from the simplistic, inaccurate prediction that free markets will eliminate
all discrimination except for a subset that is efficient. Increasingly, more
left-leaning (or just realistic) economic analyses are considering ways in
which women and other traditionally excluded groups will suffer contin-
ued exclusion from full and equal labor market participation-because,
287 See supra notes 250-251 and accompanying text.
288 Others have long advocated teaching tolerance and empathy, especially in childhood
education, which society uses to impart basic values. See, e.g., MINOW, supra note 141, at
103, 107-08, 128-30; id. at 28 (noting that psychological research shows that by age six or
seven, children have the cognitive development to take perspective of others); id. at 46
(noting that stereotyping can be passed on to children at an early age and can become part
of their worldviews).
289 See, e.g., id. at 91 (advocating educational efforts "[elliciting [facts and [n]arratives of
[g]roup-based [h]arms"); id. at 135 (advocating "new histories giving increased attention
to the experiences of previously neglected groups").
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for example, of various information problems endemic in real-world la-
bor markets29 ° or opportunistic, anticompetitive "cartel-like" behavior by
dominant groups to exclude other groups.
291
Other economic analyses have noted ways that discriminatory exclu-
sion can be self-perpetuating. Members of traditionally excluded groups face
warped incentives that can lead them rationally to adopt suboptimal labor
market strategies, 29 2 and the exclusion may cause harmful psychological ef-
fects such as stereotype threat that further inhibit them from meeting their
potential.2 93 Their exclusion is thus self-perpetuating, as members of in-
cluded groups enjoy advantages that excluded groups do not.
29 4
Though presenting a distinct theory of why gender gaps are durable,
this Article follows that line of scholarship in spirit. This Article uses eco-
nomic analysis to explain why the labor market will remain in a subopti-
mal state, with women not enjoying equal labor market opportunities and
with certain firms and sectors finding it difficult to utilize an under-tapped
pool of female labor. Several characteristics distinguish this Article's eco-
nomic model from more simplistic traditional economic analyses that
predict a gradual ascent into (near) equality. This Article incorporates into its
analysis imperfect information, endogenous and nonlinear relationships
among variables, and multiple equilibrium states of the labor market.
A. Imperfect Information: A Modification of Standard Labor
Supply Theory
Imperfect information is a common feature of economic models pre-
dicting labor force exclusion of women and minorities. Most such mod-
els, however, speak of imperfect information not on the part of the excluded
workers but on the part of employers who engage in statistical discrimi-
nation295 and otherwise form prejudices based on bad information.296 The
models in this Article differ in that they address the troubling repercus-
sions of imperfect information possessed by workers in the excluded groups.
They identify such imperfect information as a cause of continued gender
29o See, e.g., Moss & Malin, supra note 25, at 200-08.
291 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 35, at 150-56 (stating that "[d]iscriminatory social
groups are much like cartels, and a discriminatory norm is analogous to a price-fixing
agreement . .. . [For example,] southern whites actively used the power of state and local
government to reduce competition from blacks through . . . 'Jim Crow' legislation .... ");
Roithmayr, supra note 165, at 731 (noting that "coercive social norms and social payoffs
... operate to police discriminatory behavior in racist cartels" (citing Richard H. McAd-
ams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status Production and Race Dis-
crimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1046-48 (1995))).
292 See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
293 See supra Part II.B.2.b.ii.
291 See supra Part II.B.2.b.iii.
295 See supra Part III.A.
296 See supra notes 66, 142-143 and accompanying text.
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This simple point deeply contradicts standard economic analyses
viewing policy as a result of exogenous preferences, such as a certain
degree of desire for clean air: "The preference-shaping effects of legal
rules cast doubt on the idea that ... regulation should attempt to satisfy
or follow some aggregation of private preferences .... When preferences
are a function of legal rules, the rules cannot be justified by reference to
the preferences." 0' 1
While economic analyses regularly incorporate nonmonetary prefer-
ences, they often falter when preferences are endogenous. Advocates of
economic methods can be surprisingly candid in admitting they "do not
discuss all the potentially significant endogeneities in an economic analysis
.... -302 Endogeneity wreaks havoc on the simple cause-and-effect of "[t]he
prototypical economic model commonly applied to law," where "prefer-
ences are exogenous and stable."3 3
2. Endogenous Preferences and "Network Effects" as Endogeneity
in Value of Employment to Women
The models presented in this Article feature two quite different kinds of
endogeneity. First, the historical lack of diversity causes women to seek
out diversity. In a sense, this is the reverse of the sort of endogeneity Sun-
stein has discussed. In Sunstein's example, people may start to have a
preference for something (such as a clean environment) only once they
start to experience it.3" Here, in contrast, women may have a preference
for something (diversity) precisely because they have not experienced it.
The second kind of endogeneity is the value women place on certain
jobs. Historically, women "chose" fields such as teaching and nursing not
because of an immutable natural preference but because those were the
jobs open to them. Women's valuation of certain jobs is endogenously de-
pendent on the representation of women in those jobs: the more women
working in a given occupation, the more appealing that occupation is to
women. This is an endogeneity not in how the preference arises, but in-
stead in the value of the good (here, the job).0 5 Such endogeneity in the
value of goods has significant implications for market efficiency.
301 Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 65, at 234-35.
302 Posner, Radical Feminist Critique, supra note 299, at 527.
303 Baker, supra note 236, at 469.
04 See supra notes 300-301 and accompanying text.
305 Traditionally, the term "endogenous preference" refers more to the first phenome-
non (preferences arising only due to experiences and market conditions) than to the second
(the value of a good depending on how widespread it is). As discussed below, the latter is
more typically described as a "network effect," but such effects do reflect endogeneity in
the value of the good. Because this particular network effect stems from an endogenous
preference (the first point) and reflects an endogeneity in the value women place on em-
ployment (the second point), the entire phenomenon of women preferring diverse work-
places seems best described as an "endogenous preference."
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gaps and unequal opportunities for women-i.e., women rationally
choose against predominantly male jobs under conditions of uncertainty.
This information problem is the key difference between this Arti-
cle's view of labor supply (the decision whether and where to work) and
that of standard labor economics. The standard labor-economic account
of workers' decisions neglects this particular problem of imperfect in-
formation and assumes that the benefits of labor force participation are
based on many other things (e.g., money, opportunities for advancement
and training, quality of life). 297 It often takes into account that women
may draw less benefit from education and working than men because
possible discrimination diminishes the expected value of certain career
paths, thereby lessening the returns to investment in education or low-
paid but valuable work experience (i.e., the human capital problem). 298
However, the preference for diversity described in this Article applies
regardless of whether the disparity resulted from discrimination, histori-
cal accident, or both.
B. Endogeneity in Preferences and in the Value of Employment
1. Endogeneity in Economic Analysis
Traditional economic models try to explain decisions, such as job
choice, as being "caused" by independent variables, such as wages, hours,
and location. Those variables are "exogenous" because the causation is
one-way. Variables are "endogenous," in contrast, when they are also "af-
fected by the variables in the economic model, rather than just affecting
them." '299 Cass Sunstein has discussed endogenous preferences in envi-
ronmental law, noting that, contrary to the standard view of the law reflect-
ing the public's or legislators' preferences, the law influences those pref-
erences by, for example, letting people enjoy an environmental improve-
ment they had not previously valued as much.3°°
297 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
298 See supra Part II.B.2.a.
299 Richard A. Posner, The Radical Feminist Critique of Sex and Reason, 25 CONN. L.
REV. 515, 527 n.34 (1993) [hereinafter Posner, Radical Feminist Critique].
0 Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 65, at 223-25. Larry Ruff has given
a similar explanation of how people demand environmental protection only once they start
experiencing a better environment:
Pollution is not new .... What is new about pollution is what might be called the
problem of pollution. Many unpleasant phenomena-poverty, genetic defects,
hurricanes-have existed forever without being considered problems; they are, or
were, considered to be facts of life, like gravity and death, and a mature person
simply adjusted to them. Such phenomena become problems only when it begins
to appear that something can and should be done about them.
Larry E. Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, 19 PUB. INT. 69, 69-70 (1970).
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The value of employment to women is endogenous in that the pres-
ent rate of female entry depends on the past rate of female entry. Identi-
cally, the rate of workplace diversification depends on the level of diver-
sity: the more diverse the workforce, the faster it diversifies; the less di-
verse the workplace, the slower it diversifies. Consequently, we cannot make
the traditional assumption that the rate of female entry depends on inher-
ent female preferences that exist as independent (exogenous) variables.
This form of endogeneity is, in a sense, a form of "network effect":
the benefit to women of participating in the workforce is higher as more
women participate. Classic network benefits derive from using "network
products," such as e-mail, which "become more valuable as their use be-
comes more widespread."306 Network benefits are interesting mainly be-
cause they explain how phenomena can be "self-perpetuating" even if dif-
ferent market outcomes would be more efficient. Traditional economics
teaches that superior new products replace older, inferior products. But
that is not necessarily the case if the old product is in widespread use and
offers network benefits. Given such conditions, the old product's "attraction
becomes self-perpetuating" because, though inferior, it provides greater
network benefits due to its widespread use.3 °7 The superior product thus
may fail due to the standardization of the old product. The new product
would be more efficient if it achieved widespread use, but consumers will
not switch to it because switching would sacrifice the network benefits of
the standardized old product. 08
Whatever the benefits of greater equality of opportunity, inequality
may remain if there are existing gender disparities and network benefits
to workforce participation. Among the network benefits in this context
are the contacts and cultural advantages described earlier: men draw more
benefit from certain workplaces than women do solely because histori-
cally there have been more men in the workforce and in positions of power.
There are gender-based "networks"-male employees sharing commonali-
ties and forming social bonds with other men in positions of power.3°9
These networks can also take the form of men harassing and subverting
women who try to enter a male-dominated workplace. 3 There also are
network benefits to workplaces remaining male-dominated due to the
301 Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347, 351
(1996); id. at 350 (defining network benefits).
307 See id. at 348 (discussing how firms employ commonly used contract terms as op-
posed to individually customized contract terms due to standardization trends); infra notes
318-319 and accompanying text (discussing how the QWERTY keyboard gained the domi-
nant market position and therefore remained the standard despite being inferior for elec-
tronic typewriters and computers).
308 Kahan & Klausner, supra note 306, at 348.
309 See supra Part 1II.B.2.b.iii.
310 See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
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search and startup costs of bringing women into workplaces where they
are underrepresented.
In sum, the endogeneity described in this Article is a fundamental
characteristic of the labor market. Economic models that ignore such en-
dogeneity fail to recognize that powerful forces beyond legally cogniza-
ble discrimination inhibit female entry into male-dominated workplaces.
Such an omission can lead to undue optimism about male-dominated oc-
cupations becoming more gender-balanced. In fact, this endogeneity gives
cause not only for pessimism about diversification but also for trepidation
about any predictions because endogeneities can yield multiple equilib-
rium outcomes, some far preferable to others.
C. Multiple Equilibrium States and Path-Dependence: Many Market
Outcomes Possible, Some Optimal and Some Not, Depending on
Initial Conditions
A central feature of this Article's models is that there are multiple
equilibrium states31" ' of the market-a variety of different "ultimate" out-
comes in the progression toward greater diversity. A prediction of multi-
ple equilibria is a major deviation from standard predictions about diversifi-
cation, which (though not usually discussing "equilibrium states" explic-
itly) implicitly assume one unique equilibrium of equality (or near equality)
among men and women. Where markets have multiple equilibrium states,
predicting eventual outcomes is difficult; the result depends on initial
conditions and the forces fostering or inhibiting change.
1. The Standard View: One Unique Equilibrium of Equality (or
Near-Equality)
The traditional economic view, that free labor markets would elimi-
nate virtually all discrimination, is a prediction that there is one unique
equilibrium: equality for women and men, at least to the extent that both
women and men have similar characteristics as workers and a similar desire
to work. Inequality implies one or more of the following: that the labor
311 "When a market is in equilibrium, firms [or individuals] are doing the best they can
and have no reason to change their price or output .... [A] competitive market is in equi-
librium when the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded." PINDYCK & RUBIN-
FELD, supra note 69, at 430. It bears mention that the sort of equilibria discussed in this
Article are "steady state equilibria"-equilibria that are stable states of the market, not just
points at which supply equals demand (which, despite being equilibria, allow for the state
of the market to change over time). See, e.g., Giovanni Piersanti, Expected Future Budget
Deficits, the Real Exchange Rate and Current Account Dynamics in a Finite Horizon
Model, 77 J. ECON. 1, 12-13 (2002) (discussing steady state equilibrium in relationship
between budget deficits, exchange rates, and stock of bonds). For reasons of simplicity and
conformity with the economic analysis of law literature (which refers merely to "equilib-
ria," whether the concept is supply equaling demand or a stable market state), however, this
Article simply uses the term "equilibrium" throughout.
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2. Path-Dependence: Less-than-Full Equality Will Result, Even
After Discrimination Is Gone, Because of Historical Discrimination
As discussed above, existing social patterns resulting from a legacy
of discrimination are a barrier to full equality. For example, gendered
childcare norms remain powerful even after the eradication of much of the
discrimination that gave rise to them and even though such norms might
never have existed in a different labor market without a history of dis-
crimination. Gendered childcare norms thus are an example of path de-
pendence in labor markets. In path-dependent markets, "even small his-
torical events, particularly those that occur early .... can have unexpect-
edly long-lasting effects on market outcomes ... [and] produce a path far
different from the one taken in the absence of those early events."3"' The
classic example of path dependence is the "QWERTY" keyboard, which
''was initially arranged ... with letters that appeared together frequently
coming from opposite hands on the keyboard, mainly to prevent the
metal keys from jamming."3 ' Eventually, computers no longer needed the
QWERTY scheme to slow down typing to avoid jams, but the universal
initial adoption of QWERTY prevented more efficient arrangements from
evolving into widespread use.319
Few traditional economic analyses of law consider path dependence.320
They assume that labor markets will reach efficient outcomes regardless
of historical events because firms and individuals inevitably will put re-
sources, including labor, to their most valuable uses. But there may be
barriers to change that inhibit male-dominated workplaces from drawing
in more women, such as the network benefits women derive from greater
female workforce participation3 2' and the "switching costs" faced by em-
ployers adapting male-dominated workplaces.3 22 Where barriers to change
317 Roithmayr, supra note 165, at 742.
318 Id. (citing Paul A. David, Understanding the Economics of QWERTY: The Necessity
of History, in ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THE MODERN ECONOMIST 35-36 (William N.
Parker ed., 1986)).
319 
Id. at 743 (citing David, supra note 318, at 40-41, 45).
120 Posner suggests that "the convergence of legal systems is much slower than the
convergence of technology and economic institutions." Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency,
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L.
REV. 573, 584 (2000). Perhaps economic analyses tend to address path dependence in law
insufficiently because in the markets that economics traditionally studies, path dependence
is less significant. Microeconomics courses and textbooks, for example, typically explain
supply-and-demand models by using agricultural commodities as primary examples pre-
cisely because in such markets economists can use simple, linear models to show how
higher prices predictably correspond to lower sales and vice-versa. See, e.g., PINDYCK &
RUBINFELD, supra note 69, at 33-35 ("The wheat market has been studied extensively
[, and its] ... supply and demand curves are linear ... ").
321 See, e.g., Kahan & Klausner, supra note 306, at 348 (discussing how network benefits
result in path dependence through the example of corporate contract terms); Roithmayr,
supra note 165, at 742-43 (discussing path dependence in context of QWERTY keyboard).
322 Roithmayr, supra note 165, at 747-49 (discussing how switching costs can yield
path dependence).
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market is progressing toward equality slowly, but is simply not ther
yet;3'12 that women naturally choose to participate in the labor market le:
than men do, leaving women less represented than men; 313 or that sor
discrimination is efficient because it may reflect stereotypes that
sufficiently accurate bases for employment decisions.
314
There seems to be a broad ideological consensus that we are al
proaching the one unique equilibrium of (near) equality. Conservative lax
and economics scholars today, such as Posner and Epstein, typically ar.
gue that free markets will tend to eliminate inefficient, animus-based dis-
crimination without government intervention, though other forms of dis-
crimination are "efficient" and may persist. 3 " Liberals frequently argue
that further intervention, typically in the form of expanded Title VII li-
ability, is a necessary development because the progress is too slow.
316
However, both implicitly agree: we are inevitably approaching an optimal
level of equality.
312 See, e.g., POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS. supra note 24, § 11.7, at 366 (asserting
that "we can expect both the occupational and wage differences between men and women
to narrow even without governmental intervention").
313 See supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text (discussing courts embracing the
"lack of interest" defense advocated by employers justifying the lack of women in their
workplaces).
314 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds. 31 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. I, 2 (1994) (arguing that .'certain forms of race, sex, age, and disability discrimi-
nation will continue to survive in various quarters" because they are economically efficient
"but that invidious forms of discrimination will not"); POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra
note 24, § 11.7, at 366-67 (noting that "not all discrimination is inefficient," such as em-
ployers refusing to pay pregnancy benefits, and arguing that "antidiscrimination laws can
boomerang against the protected class" because if "women workers have a lower marginal
product [i.e., productivity] (maybe because they have invested less in their human capital),
employers will have an incentive to substitute capital for labor inputs ... [where] they
employ many women").
35 See supra note 314.
116 See, e.g.. Thomas J. Gehring, Hostile Work Enj'ironment Sexual Harassment After
Harris: Abolishing the Requirement of Psychological Injury, Harris v. Forklift Systems
Inc., 19 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 451, 453, 473-74 (1994) (arguing that the Supreme Court's
broadening of sexual harassment law in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 507 U.S. 959
(1993), holding that employees can sue without having suffered "so much harassment as to
suffer psychological trauma," was a "giant step in the right direction" that "was long over-
due because too many people had to endure excessive harassment before they could prevail
under Title VII," and expressing hope that with this "less stringent standard to meet when
proving a violation of Title VII," Harris "will create more litigation in the immediate fu-
ture, but then litigation may decline because employers will implement safeguards in the
workplace to stop hostile work environment sexual harassment from occurring") Marlisa
Vinciguerra, The Aftermath of Meritor: A Search for Standards in the Law of Sexual Har-
assment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721 (1989) (arguing that the development of the cause of
action for sexual harassment furthered "the remedial promise of Title VII," and advocating
a further strengthening of the doctrine).
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cause inefficient arrangements to persist, markets are path-dependent be-
cause the market's early history (here, discrimination and exclusion) has
impeded change, leaving the labor market at a segregated equilibrium.
Similarly, the history of discrimination has resulted in women's prefer-
ence for diversity, a barrier to equality that remains powerful even after
the eradication of much of the discrimination that gave rise to it. Several
recent articles have noted other examples of barriers to equality that may
remain even after we declare victory over the overt discrimination that gave
rise to those barriers. Roithmayr has written at length about the "market
lock-in" of various institutional, cultural, and other advantages for white
law students due to discrimination long ago.323 Charny and Gulati, dis-
cussing discrimination in elite occupations characterized by great subjectiv-
ity and labor surpluses, have noted that once a discriminatory equilibrium
occurs, individual firms find themselves with biased outcomes, such as an
underrepresentation of women and minorities, even if they try to pursue
ostensibly fair, neutral policies.324
Less discussed is the point that many barriers to equality would not
have existed in a different labor market without a history of discrimina-
tion.325 Admittedly, this point is implicit in many discussions of obstacles
to equality, but it bears emphasis because it contradicts a critical tenet of
traditional laissez-faire economics-that market outcomes are presump-
tively efficient326 and cannot be tinkered with effectively because market
forces tend to resist anti-equilibrium interventions.327 Path-dependent forces
influence which among multiple equilibrium outcomes occur. So when a
labor market reaches a certain equilibrium outcome-for example, if it
stabilizes with less than full equality-we need not assume that this is
the only (much less the best) possible outcome or that attempting to alter
that equilibrium is futile or inefficient.
3. Implications of Multiple Equilibria
a. Uncertain Predictions and Suboptimal Outcomes
As discussed above, once path dependence exists, a market may have
multiple equilibrium outcomes. A hypothetical labor market without a
history of gender discrimination may feature full gender equity. However,
323 Id. at 785 (asserting that "white monopoly ... is 'hard-wired' into the institutional
network").
324 Charny & Gulati, supra note 34, at 76, 102.
325 See supra Part VII.B.2.
326 See supra note 252.
327 See, e.g., Ho, supra note 188, at 323-24 (discussing and citing "argument[s] that
well-intentioned measures often backfire," including "both antidiscrimination measures
and in protective market regulation," because "harmful quantity effects (in the form of
lower quantities provided) are said to offset benefits along another welfare dimension,
usually quality or price").
2004]
Harvard Women's Law Journal
the actual labor market's history of gender discrimination affects its path
over time, leaving some gender inequity in the ultimate equilibrium out-
come.
Disciplines outside economics have recognized that "the inference of
optimality from stability is pernicious" because "it ignores how path de-
pendence can readily explain stability" of a suboptimal equilibrium.3 28 For
example, as Baker has noted, "environmental literature suggests that tra-
ditional ideas about stasis and equilibria are inaccurate. Any kind of equi-
libri[um] we see in nature is temporary because change is an inevitable
part of nature"; in that field, unlike in economics, there is a "now well-
established nonequilibrium paradigm.
329
The possibility of a suboptimal equilibrium has received some implicit
recognition in the game theory notion that "strategic interactions can lead
to inefficient results."33 An equilibrium will remain stable, however ineffi-
cient, so long as no incremental change is an improvement (i.e., so long
as no one person or small group can improve matters by changing their
actions). Sometimes, only a holistic, systemic change can improve mat-
ters, such as enforced pooling of health insurance to eliminate the adverse
selection equilibrium of only less healthy people buying insurance.33" ' A
change might be an improvement, but it may be unlikely to occur absent a
major legal or social effort to force society into a more efficient or so-
cially desirable equilibrium.
The possibility of multiple equilibrium outcomes causes problems
for economic analysis. Ian Ayres has noted that multiple equilibrium models
are "underspecified, 332 in that one of the "limits of rational choice expla-
nations" is difficulty predicting which among the multiple equilibrium
outcomes will occur.33 3 We need noneconomic theories to help us predict
which equilibrium will prevail and to know what preferences exist that
contribute to the dominance of an equilibrium. The economic analysis in
this Article comports with noneconomic theories of gender inequity, yield-
ing both a determinate prediction of which of the multiple equilibrium out-
comes will occur and a compelling argument as to why this outcome is
inefficient: our history of discrimination and exclusion makes it rational
for women to choose more diverse workplaces, and that preference rein-
forces existing gender gaps, causing the market to stabilize at an inefficient-
ly unequal equilibrium of male and female workers.
32 Baker, supra note 236, at 50 1.
329 Id. at 513.
330 Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1291, 1315-16 (1990).
331 Id.
332 Id. at 1310-11; see also Baker, supra note 236, at 509 (stating that "[miultiple
equilibria do not provide simple and parsimonious answers .. . [and] often fail to provide
any 'answer' at all"); Roithmayr, supra note 165, at 746 (noting that "markets are capable
of producing multiple outcomes, which are unpredictable in advance").
333 Ho, supra note 188, at 341, n.68 (quoting JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 168 (1989)).
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b. The Coase Theorem Violated
The idea that the same "market forces" may yield different outcomes
given different initial conditions violates the Coase Theorem, which holds
that as long as transactions occur freely and without cost, markets reach
efficient results, regardless of the initial distributions of entitlements such
as wealth, jobs, or property.33 4 In this Article's models, however, different
initial conditions yield different incentives for women. The traditional
limitation on (and criticism of) the Coase Theorem is that, because few
markets feature costless transactions, the exceptions swallow the rule.335
Given the nontrivial transaction costs that exist in most markets, not all
efficient changes occur, so the initial state of the market helps determine
the ultimate outcome and may prevent the market from reaching an efficient
outcome.
A less-noted limitation on the Coase Theorem is that it "takes pref-
erences as both static and given," '336 causing ignored endogenous prefer-
ences to wreak havoc on its predictions. As Sunstein has explained:
[A]llocation [of entitlements] may well have an effect on peo-
ple's preferences, since people tend to prefer things that have
been initially allocated to them; it might also affect distributions
and hence end-states .... Hence the Coase Theorem will some-
times be wrong insofar as it predicts the initial allocation of the
entitlement will not affect outcomes.
337
In this Article's models, women's preferences vary depending on the ini-
tial state of the labor market. If women historically had enjoyed equal
employment rights, they would not value workplace diversity as much, if
at all. But because women have not always enjoyed equal employment
rights, the level of diversity of a firm (or occupation or sector) can matter
a great deal. Consequently, compared to an unsegregated labor market, a
heavily segregated labor market will feature women making different
employment decisions, which will lead to different labor market outcomes
with different levels of segregation.
331 PINDYCK & RUBINFELD, supra note 69, § 18.3, at 640; Sunstein, Endogenous Pref-
erences, supra note 65, at 223.
"I E.g., Leonard Bierman & Rafael Gely, Striker Replacements: A La; Economics,
and Negotiations Approach, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 385-86 (1995) ("As Coase himself
has pointed out, however, bargaining situations characterized by zero transaction costs are
rare. In the presence of transaction costs, efficient allocation is increasingly difficult."
(citing RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988))).
336 Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 65, at 223.
331 Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules. 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 1017 & n.259 (1995)
(citing Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 65, at 223-24) (other citation omit-
ted).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article's main substantive argument is that enduring occupa-
tional segregation can be explained, at least partly, by women's prefer-
ence for diverse workplaces. That preference is entirely rational because
women know that discrimination and harassment can inhibit their careers,
but they do not know which occupations or particular firms discriminate.
Choosing more gender-diverse workplaces is a rational solution to that
information problem because more diverse workplaces are less likely to
feature gender discrimination.
Though a rational solution to the problem of choosing where to work,
the preference for diverse workplaces leads to quite troubling (and coun-
terintuitive) aggregate labor market outcomes. Occupational segregation
is far more durable than traditional economic analyses recognize: segre-
gation remains even as the labor force as a whole comes to include more
women and even absent ongoing discrimination. As a result, even as
women come to comprise almost half the labor force, they still have an
incentive to avoid the occupations and particular firms that remain male-
dominated. A reduction in intentional discrimination may not be enough
to eliminate this segregation: once there is some amount of discrimina-
tion somewhere in the labor market, it is rational for women to try to
avoid that discrimination by choosing diverse workplaces.
These models have significant theoretical implications for law and
economics generally. They depict labor markets in which preferences are
not fixed but instead are endogenously dependent on market conditions.
Thus, the Coase Theorem does not hold, and the market's evolution is
path-dependent, yielding multiple possible equilibria, some far preferable
to others as a matter of both efficiency and equity.
The normative implications of this theory are not quite categorical.
Conservatives might argue that occupational segregation is a blameless
result of women's own choices, not of employer wrongdoing. Blaming
women's "choices," however, is a misinterpretation that ignores the real-
ity that such "choices" are constrained by historical discrimination. To
the contrary, the durability of segregation supports a litany of liberal policy
and legal interventions, from tougher Title VII liability to affirmative action
to educational reform. Such interventions appear necessary if we are ever
to break the labor market out of the deeply flawed equilibrium that it has
reached as a result of our society's history of discrimination and exclusion.
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